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This article deals with the function, scope and effect of
umbrella clauses in international investment treaties. It
proposes to analyze umbrella clauses not from the perspective of
the traditional dualist framework that contrasts breaches of
contracts and breaches of treaties, but instead develops the
function of umbrella clauses against the background of an
economic analysis of the relations between foreign investors and
host States. The dualist approach, it is argued, fails to grasp the
economic objective of investor-State cooperation to achieve cost-
efficient bargains by attenuating the State's capacity to make
credible and enforceable commitments and thus increases the
costs of contracting with a sovereign. This article understands
umbrella clauses as breaking with the dualist framework and
its limited protection of contracts under customary international
law. It argues that the function of the clauses consists of
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stabilizing investor-State relations by opening recourse to
dispute settlement by arbitral tribunals for breaches of specific
and individual promises made by the State vis-A-vis investors.
Umbrella clauses, in this view, allow investors to bring any
claim for the breach of an investment-related promise made by
the host State under the jurisdiction of a treaty-based tribunal.
Umbrella clauses thereby enable "private ordering" in investor-
State relations by preventing host States from acting
opportunistically in reneging on their initial promises. It applies
to host State breaches of a governmental nature as well as
breaches of a purely commercial character that offset the
original investor-State bargain. By enabling the enforcement of
host State promises, umbrella clauses reinforce the principle of
pacta sunt servanda as a fundamental basis for investor-State
contracts. The clauses do not, however, address issues, which
often arise in long-term investment relations, relating to
contingencies, nor do they override the State's police power to
regulate investor-State contracts in the public interest that is
recognized under customary international law.
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I. INTRODUCTION: "SPIRITS THAT I'VE CITED-MY
COMMANDS IGNORE..."?
Many investment treaties contain clauses providing that
"[e]ach Contracting Party shall observe any other obligation it
has assumed with regard to investments by nationals or
companies of the other Contracting Party in its territory."' Such
clauses are most commonly designated as "umbrella clauses"2
because they create a separate obligation under the investment
treaty, requiring the Contracting Parties to observe obligations
the host State has assumed in its relations with nationals of the
other Contracting Party. Until recently, little debate existed as
to the construction, the scope of application, and the general
effect of such clauses. Commentators, rather unanimously,
opined that
[tihese provisions seek to ensure that each Party to the treaty will
respect specific undertakings towards nationals of the other Party. The
provision is of particular importance because it protects the investor's
contractual rights against any interference which might be caused by
either a simple breach of contract or by administrative or legislative
acts, and because it is not entirely clear under general international
law whether such measures constitute breaches of an international
1. German-Argentine BIT, F.R.G.-Arg., Apr. 9, 1991, BGB1. II 1993, 1244
("Artikel 2 (1). Jede Vertragspartei wird in ihrem Hoheitsgebiet Kapitalanlagen von
Staatsangehbrigen oder Gesellschaften der anderen Vertragspartei fdrdern und
diese Kapitalanlangen in Obereinstimmung mit ihren Rechtsvorschriften
zulassen."). It is estimated that approximately 40% of bilateral investment treaties
contain umbrella clauses. See Judith Gill et al., Contractual Claims and Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 397, 403 n.31 (2004).
2. Other designations include "elevator clauses," "parallel effect clauses," or
"mirror effect clauses." See Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause
in the International Law of Investment Protection, 20 ARB. INT'L 411, 412-13 (2004),
for a discussion of the different designations and the origin of the term "umbrella
clause."
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obligation.
3
One should have thus expected little difficulty in the application
of umbrella clauses by arbitral tribunals. In practice, however,
their application has turned into one of the most contentious
issues of international investment law.4
3. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
81-82 (1995); accord GEORGES R. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS-
APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (1993); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE,
UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES 81 et seq. (1992); OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 408 (Robert Y. Jennings & Arthur D. Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN
THE MID-1990'S 56 (1998); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990'S 56 (1998); Derek W. Bowett, State
Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments in Compensation for
Termination or Breach of Contract of International Law, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49
(1988); Joachim Karl, The Promotion and Protection of German Foreign Investment
Abroad, 11 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 23 (1996); Marian Nash Leich,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 885, 898 (1990); F. A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 242, 246 (1981); Franqois Rigaux,
Les situations juridiques individuelles dans un syst~me de relativiti gdndrale, 213
RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 230 (1989-I); Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Applicable Law in
International Arbitration: Specific Aspects in Case of the Involvement of State-
Parties, in 2 THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS AND
LECTURES 595, 601 (Ibrahim F. I. Shihata & James D. Wolfensohn eds., 1995);
Prosper Weil, Probl~mes relatifs aux contracts passds entre un Etat et un particulier,
128 RECUEIL DES COURS 95, 130 (1969-IIl).
4. For the more recent debate surrounding the application of the umbrella
clause, see Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty, 5
J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 555 (2004); John P. Gaffney & James L. Loftis, The
"Effective Ordinary Meaning" of BITs and the Jurisdiction of Treaty-Based
Tribunals to Hear Contract Claims, 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 5 (2007); Walid Ben
Hamida, La clause relative au respect des engagements dans les traites
d'investissement, in NOUVEAUX DEVELOPPEMENTS DANS LE CONTENTIEUX ARBITRAL
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIF A L'INVESTISSEMENT INTERNATIONAL 53 (Charles Leben ed.,
2006); Bjorn Kunoy, Singing in the Rain - Developments in the Interpretation of
Umbrella Clauses, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 275 (2006); Hein-Jiirgen Schramke,
The Interpretation of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 4
TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. (May 2007); Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route:
Of Waiting Period, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 231, 249-55 (2004); Sinclair, supra note 2; Thomas W. Wdlde, Contract
Claims under the Energy Charter's Umbrella Clause: Original Intentions versus
Emerging Jurisprudence, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER
TREATY 205 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006); Thomas W. Wilde, The "Umbrella Clause"
in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Cases, 6 J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 183 (2005); Andr6 von Walter, Die Reichweite von
Schirmklauseln in Invest itionsschutzabkommen nach der jiingsten ICSID-
Spruchpraxis, 52 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 815 (2006); Jarrod
Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract,
Treaty Violations, and the Divide between Developing and Developed Countries in
Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 (2006); Vlad Zolia, Effect
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Triggered by the incompatible construction of comparable
clauses in the Swiss-Pakistani and the Swiss-Philippine
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) by two ICSID tribunals,5
contrary views developed on the function of umbrella clauses in
investment treaties. One line of jurisprudence supports a broad
application of umbrella clauses allowing foreign investors to use
investment treaty arbitration in order to seek relief for any
breach of an investment-related promise by the host State,
independent of the nature of the obligations and independent of
the nature of the breach, and thus relates to commercial as well
as sovereign conduct of host States.6 In this view, umbrella
clauses go beyond customary international law by permitting
foreign investors to bring claims for the breach of host State
promises as a violation of the umbrella clause under the
respective investment treaty without being restricted to
targeting expropriatory, discriminatory or arbitrary conduct or,
more generally, breaches of a sovereign nature. Umbrella
clauses thus bridge the traditional distinction between
municipal and international law, between contracts and
treaties, by providing an international law remedy in case of
any, even if "simple" or commercial, breach of an investor-State
contract.
The competing approach attributes a narrower function to
umbrella clauses in only restricting a State's sovereign conduct.
In this view, the breach of an umbrella clause requires the
breach of an investor-State contract resulting from a sovereign
and Purpose of "Umbrella Clauses" in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Unresolved
-Issues, 2 TRANSNAT'L DIsp. MGMT. (2004); Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of
the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements (OECD Working Papers on
International Investment 2006/3, 2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/20/37579220.pdf.
5. SGS Socidt6 G6ndrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, paras.
113-28 (Jan. 29, 2004); SGS Soci~t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections
to Jurisdiction, paras. 163-73 (Aug. 6, 2003). All arbitral awards, unless expressly
stated otherwise, can be downloaded via http://ita.law.uvic.ca.
6. Supporting the broader view, see CMS Gas Transmission Company v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Annulment,
paras. 89-95 (Sept. 25, 2007); Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, paras. 204-06 (Feb. 6, 2007); LG&E Energy Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability,
paras. 169-75 (Oct. 3, 2006); Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, paras. 46-62 (Oct. 12, 2005); SGS v. Philippines, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/6, at paras. 113-28; Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland,
UNCITRAL, Partial Award, paras. 244-60 (Aug. 19, 2005).
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act of the host State.7 Essentially, this approach views umbrella
clauses as a declaratory codification of customary international
law that clarifies that rights of an investor under an investor-
State contract can form the object of an expropriation and
accordingly require compensation in case they are taken.' Most
importantly, this position excludes breaches of a purely
commercial nature and reads the distinction between contract
claims and treaty claims into the interpretation of the umbrella
clause. This excludes "simple" or commercial breaches of
investor-State contracts from its scope of application.
However, not only the function of umbrella clauses has
divided arbitral tribunals. Tribunals have also developed
divergent views on the scope of protection that umbrella clauses
offer, i.e. the question of what kind of host State promises they
cover. Some consider umbrella clauses to be limited to the
protection of investor-State contracts, while others include
specific host State promises in a broader sense.' Furthermore,
contention exists regarding the effect of umbrella clauses on
contractual relations between foreign investors and host States.
This concerns the question of how umbrella clauses affect the
interplay between the international treaty law that governs the
relations between host States and investors' home States and
7. See Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/02/16, Award, paras. 305-14 (Sept. 28, 2007); Pan American Energy LLC, and
BP Argentina Exploration Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/03/13, and BP America Production Company, Pan American Sur SRL, Pan
American Fueguina, SRL and Pan American Continental SRL v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/8 (consolidated claims), Decision on
Preliminary Objections, paras. 100-16 (July 27, 2006); El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction,
paras. 71-88 (Apr. 27, 2006); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, paras. 296-303 (May 12,
2005); see also Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, paras. 273-77 (May 22, 2007) (holding
that the respondent assumed obligations under the umbrella clause by passing
legislation, but not explicitly ruling on what, if any, contractual obligations are
covered by the umbrella clause).
8. Cf. Thomas W. Wiilde, Contract Claims under the Energy Charter's
Umbrella Clause: Original Intentions versus Emerging Jurisprudence, in
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 201, 217 (Claude
Ribeiro ed., 2006) ("The umbrella clause was not seen as something radically new,
but rather as a clarification of the prevalent theory ... that international law, be it
in its customary or treaty-based form, did not allow governments to rely on their
specific sovereign powers to undercut long-term contractual arrangements set up to
regulate a state-foreign direct investor relationship."); see also Wdlde, "Umbrella
Clause" in Investment Arbitration, supra note 4, passim.
9. See infra Part V.
2009]
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the municipal law that governs the relations between States
and investors."0  Differences in this respect play out, in
particular, regarding the resolution of potential jurisdictional
conflicts between the dispute settlement forum provided under
the investment treaty and the forum selected in an investor-
State contract."
What is uncontested, by contrast, is that umbrella clauses
do not apply to contracts between private parties even if one of
them is a foreign investor, as it is an obligation between the
contracting States to observe their obligations vis-A-vis foreign
investors. 2 In addition, their wording clarifies that umbrella
clauses do not affect the State's regulation of nonexistent, future
commitments, but only concern the observance of existing
commitments. Umbrella clauses do not, therefore, restrict
States in the terms and conditions they offer when contracting
with foreign investors. 3 Equally, what seems to be common
ground among arbitral tribunals is an unease about the
potential limitlessness of the clauses' scope if not handled with a
restrictive approach to interpretation. 4  Like in Goethe's
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at 82; Mann, supra note 3, at 246.
Misplaced, in this context, is El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 84 (Apr. 27, 2006)
("[T]here is no doubt that if the State interferes with contractual rights by a
unilateral act, whether these rights stem from a contract entered into by a foreign
investor with a private party, a State autonomous entity or the State itself, in such a
way that the State's action can be analysed as a violation of the standards of
protection embodied in a BIT, the treaty-based arbitration tribunal has jurisdiction
over all the claims of the foreign investor, including the claims arising from a
violation of its contractual rights.").
13. It is, however, conceivable that the content of contracts that States offer to
foreign investors or the procedure in which they are passed violates other investors'
rights, such as fair and equitable treatment. See generally Stephan Schill, Fair and
Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of
Law, (IILJ Global Administrative Law Series, Working Paper 2006/6), available at
http://www.iilj.org/20066SchillGAL.htm (noting that the fair and equitable
treatment standard is increasingly invoked by arbitral tribunals, but that the
standard is vague).
14. See, e.g., Pan American Energy LLC, and BP Argentina Exploration Co. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/13, and BP America
Production Co., Pan American Sur SRL, Pan American Fueguina, SRL and Pan
American Continental SRL v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/04/8 (consolidated claims), Decision on Preliminary Objections, para. 110 (July
27, 2006) (noting that investors are unlikely to show restraint in bringing claims, so
the tribunals should show the appropriate restraint); El Paso Energy, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/15, para. 82 (warning of the "far-reaching consequences of a broad
interpretation of the so-called umbrella clauses"); SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale de
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Zauberlehrling, arbitral tribunals seem to be afraid of the
independent lives umbrella clauses could assume once released
into uncontrollable freedom: "Spirits that I've cited/My
commands ignore."'5
Certainly, the main reason for this concern is the lack of
textual and interpretative guidance provided by investment
treaties for alleviating the multiple insecurities surrounding
umbrella clauses. In particular, only having regard to the
wording of most umbrella clauses, without a conceptual
framework of their function, scope, and effect in mind, will
hardly solve the difficult interpretative conundrums connected
with their implementation and application. Similarly, academic
writing only offers glimpses into a more conceptual framework
for the function of umbrella clauses. Such writing is particularly
scarce in drawing connections between the different
interpretations of umbrella clauses and the economic effects
these interpretations have on investor-State relations, although
investment treaties intend to establish a framework "to protect
and to promote foreign investment flows between the
contracting State parties."'6  This objective suggests that
investment treaties aim at establishing institutions that govern
the relations between the State, the economy, and individual
economic actors, 7 and that are conducive to increasing trans-
border investment flows and eventually economic growth and
development.' 8
Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 167 (Aug. 6, 2003) (arguing
that a broad interpretation would be too burdensome on contracting parties); see
also Gill et al., supra note 1, at 405 (commenting that the Tribunal in SGS v.
Pakistan feared that a broad interpretation of the clause would "potentially open the
floodgates" to an unlimited number of reciprocal or unilateral commitments by the
host State independent of their legal status in domestic law); Wdlde, "Umbrella
Clause" in Investment Arbitration, supra note 4, at 215 (discussing arguments for
why the Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan feared "opening the floodgates").
15. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, Der Zauberlehrling, in GOETHE, THE
LYRICIST 102, 109 (Edwin H. Zeydel trans., The University of North Carolina Press
1955) (1779).
16. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at 11-13, 20-25, on the object and
purpose of investment treaties and the statements contained in their preambles.
17. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) (stating that institutions are "rules of the game
in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction"). Contracts and dispute settlement mechanisms for their
enforcement are institutions in this sense.
18. For a discussion of the connection between institutions and growth, see THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT (Edgardo Buscaglia et al. eds., Jai Press
1997); Jean-Philippe Platteau, Institutions, Social Norms, and Economic
20091
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Consequently, this article uses an economic framework to
explain the function of umbrella clauses. It argues that they
Development, in 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Kaushik Basu ed.,
Harwood Academic Publishers 2000). For a more recent discussion of the connection
between institutions and growth, see Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as the
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in 1A HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
385 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2005) ; Agnbs B6nassy-Qu~r6 et al.,
Institutional Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment, 30 WORLD ECON. 764
(2007); Dani Rodrik et al., Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over
Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 131
(2004). For criticism of the causality between political institutions and growth, see
Edward L. Glaeser et al., Do Institutions Cause Growth?, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 271
(2004). But see Abdur Chowdhury & George Mavrotas, FDI and Growth: What
Causes What?, 29 WORLD ECON. 9 (2006); Henrik Hansen & John Rand, On the
Causal Links between FDI and Growth in Developing Countries, 29 WORLD ECON. 21
(2006) (both suggesting bi-directional causality between foreign direct investment
and growth).
The causality between the conclusion of investment treaties and the actual
flow of foreign investment is still another issue. Initially, there was quite some
skepticism about whether BITs actually have the effect of stimulating investment
flows between the contracting State parties. Two earlier studies in particular found
no significantly positive relationship between the conclusion of BITs and an increase
in investment inflows into the country. Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus Causation (May 5, 2008),
http://www.economics.smu.edu.sg/events/Paper/emma-aisbett.pdf; Mary Hallward-
Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit.. .And They
Could Bite (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper Series No. WPS 3121,
2003); Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the
Business Environment in Developing Countries: the Impact of Bilateral Investment
Treaties (Yale Law & Economics Working Paper Series,, Research Paper No. 293,
May 2, 2005) available for download at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557121 (finding no
positive relationship). The bulk of the studies, however, including a more recent one
by Tobin and Rose-Ackermann, find a positive relationship between signing BITs
and FDI flows. See Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some
Bite: The Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, in THE
FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Roger P. Alford & Catherine Rogers eds.,
forthcoming 2008), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/WhenBITsHaveSomeBite.doc; see also
Tim Bithe & Helen V. Milner, The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into
Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?, 52
AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming Oct. 2008); Peter Egger & Valeria Merlo, The Impact of
Bilateral Investment Treaties on FDI Dynamics, 30 WORLD ECON. 1536 (2007); Peter
Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on
Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 788 (2004); Kevin P. Gallagher &
Melissa B.L. Birch, Do Investment Agreements Attract Investment? Evidence from
Latin America, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 961, 969 (2006); Eric Neumayer & Laura
Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to
Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567 (2005); Jeswald W. Salacuse &
Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L. J. 67 (2005); Kim Sokchea,
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Political Risk, and Foreign Direct Investment (2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909760.
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enhance the capacity of host States to make credible and
enforceable commitments in their relations with foreign
investors by establishing effective, treaty-based dispute
settlement and enforcement mechanisms for host State
promises. Umbrella clauses allow host States and investors to
achieve bargains that are more cost-efficient compared to the
investor-State cooperation that takes place outside the realm of
effective contract enforcement. This function of umbrella
clauses, it is submitted, is not limited to mitigating inequalities
between foreign investors and a host State stemming from the
sovereign power and prerogatives of the host State, but equally
targets the shortcomings in dispute settlement and enforcement
in the case of non-sovereign breaches of investor-State contracts
by the host State. 9 In accordance with this function, a
distinction between interferences of a governmental and those of
a commercial character is not adequate. Overall, umbrella
clauses are understood to enable and strengthen forms of
"private ordering" in investor-State relations, forms that involve
the empowerment of investors and States to cooperate and order
their interactions based on consensual agreement reached
among equals by way of negotiation."
In order to forward this argument, Part II focuses on the
limitations the traditional dualist distinction between
international and national law imposes on cost-efficient
investor-State contracting and cooperation. It outlines the
significance of making credible commitments in order to
immunize investor-State bargains from opportunistic behavior
of the host State and to allow for efficient investor-State
cooperation, and submits that this often requires effective
enforcement mechanisms through independent third party
dispute resolution. However, under both domestic legal systems
and the customary international law framework, there are
shortcomings in regards to effective enforcement mechanisms
for host State promises. Above all, the dualist framework of
international law, with its strict distinction between municipal
and international law and the distinction between contract
claims and treaty claims, attenuates the capacity of the host
19. Cf. Pierre Mayer, La neutralisation du pouvoir normatif de l'Etat en
mati~re de contrats d'Etat, 113 J. DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 5 (1986) (noting that the
normative power of the host State comprises both its function as legislator and judge
over the scope of enforceability of the promises it makes).
20. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979).
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State to make credible commitments to foreign investors and
thus constitutes an impediment to cost-efficient investor-State
cooperation.
Against this backdrop, Part III submits that umbrella
clauses have to be understood as a reaction to the insufficient
protection of investor-State contracts by international law and
as a departure from a dualist conception that paradigmatically
contrasts international relations and investor-State relations.
The primary function of the umbrella clause, it is argued, has to
be seen in its jurisdictional nature that allows investors to
initiate treaty-based arbitration for the breach of promises made
by the host State vis-A-vis the investor. By offering enforcement
mechanisms on the level of international law, umbrella clauses
stabilize the relationship between the host State and foreign
investors ex post against opportunistic host State behavior. This
departure from the dualist conception is, however, not a
fundamental breakage with the essence of international law and
international dispute resolution as such. Rather, the
international law of nations has always, at various times and in
different dispute settlement fora, accepted that States could
submit claims for the breach of municipal law to international
dispute settlement.
Part IV then turns to the effect umbrella clauses have on
the substantive relations between investors and host States and
the law that governs them. It argues that the clauses, while
reinforcing the principle of pacta sunt servanda, do not alter the
legal nature of the relationship between investor and host State.
They do not automatically elevate their relations to be governed
by international law, nor do they transform breaches of
domestic law into breaches of international law. Umbrella
clauses merely open recourse to investment treaty arbitration in
order to enforce host State promises governed by whatever,
mostly municipal, law the parties to an investor-State contract
chose as governing their relations. Equally, umbrella clauses
are limited to targeting and sanctioning opportunistic behavior
of host States, but do not provide solutions to problems arising
out of contingencies emerging in investor-State relations. The
inclusion of an umbrella clause does, therefore, not exclude
exceptions to the sanctity of contracts based on doctrines of
change of circumstances, force majeure, necessity, or the like
under the law governing the relations between investor and
State in question, nor does it override the competences of the
host State to avail itself of its police power to regulate investor-
[Vol. 18:1
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State contracts as recognized under customary international
law.
Finally, Part V examines the scope of the umbrella clause
ratione materiae and analyzes the kind of commitments the
clauses cover. It argues that umbrella clauses cover contractual
as well as such quasi-contractual commitments that can be
viewed as a substitute for an investor-State contract, even
though they may take the form of unilateral acts by the host
State or emanate from its domestic legislation. It is, however,
crucial that such promises relate to an investment as defined in
the respective investment treaty. This article submits, therefore,
that umbrella clauses break with the limited protection of host
State promises under international law by establishing the
jurisdiction of investment tribunals for any breach of such
promises. They are not limited to protecting against
expropriatory, discriminatory, or arbitrary conduct, but
comprehensively aim at providing an infrastructure that backs
up "private ordering" between investors and States.
II. THE DUALIST FRAMEWORK'S LIMITATIONS TO
EFFICIENT INVESTOR-STATE CONTRACTING
Arbitral jurisprudence on the umbrella clause is
fundamentally divided between an approach that gives effect to
the plain meaning of the clauses and a more restrictive
approach that focuses on systemic issues concerning the
relationship between municipal and international law, contract
claims and treaty claims. The first approach considers that any
breach of a promise made by the host State vis-d-vis a foreign
investor gives rise to a violation of the umbrella clause and,
accordingly, entitles the investor to damages." This approach
mainly relies on three arguments. First, it stresses the plain
wording of the clauses that in most cases "say clearly, that each
Contracting Party shall observe any legal obligation it has
assumed, or will in the future assume, with regard to specific
investments covered by the BIT."22 Second, it stresses the
21. See cases cited supra note 6.
22. SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para.
115 (Jan. 29, 2004); see also Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/01/11, Award, para. 51 (Oct. 12, 2005); Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, para. 204 (Feb. 6, 2007); Eureko, supra
note 6, para. 246.
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principle of effective interpretation of international treaties-a
treaty provision has to be given an operative meaning rather
than an interpretation that renders it meaningless.23 Effective
interpretation, in this view, requires giving the umbrella clause
a scope of application that is different from the scope of
application of other investor's rights, such as expropriation or
fair and equitable treatment. Finally, this approach invokes the
object and purpose of investment treaties in order to support a
broad interpretation of umbrella clauses. 4
The second approach, by contrast, does not deny the
importance of treaty interpretation, but stresses a systematic
aspect regarding the relationship between international law and
municipal law.25 Instead of focusing primarily on the wording of
the clause, the principle of effective interpretation, and the
teleology of investment treaties, it starts from the premise of the
conceptual and fundamental difference between contracts,
governed by municipal law, and international treaties, which
are governed by international law. 6 Based on this distinction,
the narrower approach emphasizes the disruptive effect that a
broad and literal interpretation of umbrella clauses would have
on the distinction between international law, as governing the
relations between States, and municipal law, as governing the
23. See SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, at para. 115; Noble
Ventures, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, at para. 50; Eureko, supra note 6, paras. 248-
249.
24. See SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, at para. 116; Noble
Ventures, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, at para. 52; Eureko, supra note 6, paras. 255-
57.
25. See Pan American Energy LLC, and BP Argentina Exploration Co. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/13, and BP America
Production Co., Pan American Sur SRL, Pan American Fueguina SRL and Pan
American Continental SRL v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/04/8 (consolidated claims), Decision on Preliminary Objections, para. 110 (July
27, 2006); El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 82 (Apr. 27, 2006); SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale
de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 167 (Aug. 6, 2003).
26. This distinction has been firmly established as a conceptual divide between
two different, and in principle independent, legal orders with their proper scope of
application and regulation by the mainstream positivist school of international law.
See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 20 (1st ed. 1905) ("The Law of
Nations and the Municipal Law of the single States are essentially different from
each other .... Municipal Law regulates relations between the individuals under the
sway of the respective State and the relations between this State and the respective
individuals. International Law, on the other hand, regulates relations between the
member States of the Family of Nations."); see also HEINRIcH TRIEPEL,
VOLKERRECHT UND LANDESRECHT 9 (1899).
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relationship between the State and private individuals. A broad
interpretation of umbrella clauses is viewed as transforming
breaches of contract into breaches of a treaty, although the
investor is not a subject of international law.27 The more
restrictive approach is, therefore, driven, as the Tribunal in El
Paso v. Argentina pointed out, by avoiding the "far-reaching
consequences of a broad interpretation of the so-called umbrella
clause, quite destructive of the distinction between national
legal orders and the international legal order".2" Under this
approach, tribunals treat the contract claim/treaty claim
distinction as a firm rule of customary international law that
could only be displaced by treaty provisions that express more
clearly the intention of States to break with the purportedly
strict distinction between international and municipal law. The
wording of umbrella clauses, by contrast, is not considered to be
sufficient for this objective.29
27. El Paso Energy, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, para. 82 ("[A]n umbrella
clause cannot transform any contract claim into a treaty claim, as this would
necessarily imply that any commitments of the State in respect to investments, even
the most minor ones, would be transformed into treaty claims."); see also id., para.
77 (pointing out that a broad interpretation of the umbrella clause would yield the
consequence that "the division between the national legal order and the
international legal order is completely blurred"); SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/13, at para. 172 (describing umbrella clauses as resulting in a
"transubstantiation of contract claims into BIT claims").
28. El Paso Energy, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, para. 82; see also SGS v.
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, at para. 166 ("As a matter of textuality... the
scope of Article 11 of the BIT, while consisting in its entirety of only one sentence,
appears susceptible of almost indefinite expansion."). The emphasis on the
delineation between the national and the international legal order echoes some
earlier writings on umbrella clauses. In view of the blurring effect the clauses have
on the relationship between national and international law, Prosper Weil asserted
that his interpretation would have to focus on the delineation of the national and
international legal order. See Weil, supra note 3, at 101 ("[Lie probl~me ne soit plus
seulement, dans ce cas, de d6finir les droits et obligations respectives des deux
parties, mais 6galement, et peut-6tre au premier chef, celui des fronti~res entre les
divers ordres juridiques.").
29. See SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, at para. 171 (holding that
the clause in question in the Swiss-Pakistani treaty "would have to be considerably
more specifically worded before it can reasonably be read in the extraordinarily
expansive manner submitted by the Claimant"). Similarly on the relationship
between established rules and principles of international law and overriding treaty
provisions, see Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy),
1989 I.C.J. 15, 42 (Judgment of July 20), which states that "the Chamber finds itself
unable to accept that an important principle of customary international law should
be held to have been tacitly dispensed with, in the absence of any words making
clear an intention to do so." See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. Reports 16, 47 (Advisory Opinion of June 21);
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In essence, the broader or "plain meaning" approach can be
characterized as a contract centered approach that focuses on
the contractual bond between investor and State and its
implementation, while the more restrictive view is primarily
driven by the systematic concern to delineate the scope of
application of the domestic and the international legal orders.
This approach is, therefore, primarily contract law centered3 °
and stresses the importance of the applicable legal order for
determining the rights and obligations in investor-State
relations. The contract centered approach perceives the contract
primarily as a social and economic bond between the parties
that empowers them to order their mutual relations
autonomously,3 while the contract law centered approach
understands the contract as a legal institution that restricts the
private ordering of the parties and embeds their relations into
and restricts their autonomy within the confines of a legal
framework.32 For the contract law centered approach, contracts
only exist within the limits of the law,33 whereas the contract
The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, para. 160 (June 26, 2003); cf. Amoco
International Finance Corporation v. Iran, 15 Iran-U. S. Claims Trib. Rep. 189, 222
(1987) (discussing the importance of customary international law for interpreting
treaty law).
30. The term "contract law" in this context is understood in a broad and non-
technical sense as designating the law that governs the contractual relations
between the parties. It is not understood in the more technical terms as the specific
field of law that governs contractual relations in general.
31. See Maurice Bourquin, Arbitration and Economic Development Agreements,
15 BUS. LAW. 860, 867 et seq. (1960) (arguing that special arbitration tribunals
between states and private parties "thrown into relief the special position of the
legal relationship resulting from the agreement"); Alfred Verdross, Protection of
Private Property under Quasi-International Agreements, NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT
VOOR INTERNATIONAAL RECHT, JULY 1959, at 356-59 (1959) (arguing that "an
agreement concluded in application of the principle 'pacta sunt servanda' can found
a new community"). See generally Alfred Verdross, Quasi-International Agreements
and International Economic Transactions, 18 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 230 (1964); Weil,
supra note 3, 177-78.
32. This approach becomes apparent, for example, in F. A. Mann, State
Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 572, 581 (1960) (stating that
the "law [governing a contract] 'not merely sustains but, because it sustains, may
also modify or dissolve the contractual bond"') (quoting Kahler v. Midland Bank LD.,
[1950] A.C. 24, 56 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)).
33. Cf. Weil supra note 3, at 181-88 ("On voit mal comment la volont6 des
parties pourrait A elle seule engendrer un nouvel order juridique; cette volont6 ne
produit elle-mbme des effets de droit que dans la mesure oil elle s'intbgre dans un
ordre prexistant qui decide que l'accord des volontbs peut produire, dans certaines
conditions, de tels effets de droit. Le principe pacta sunt servanda et celui de
l'autonomie de la volontd eux-m~mes ne flottent pas dans le vide, et il faut un
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centered approach attributes to the governing law the function
of backing up the economic exchange the contracting parties
envisage and that underlies their relations. It stresses the
parties' autonomy and considers that their relations are
established by force of their contractual consensus, not by any
governing law. The difference between both approaches reflects
the difference between understanding contracts primarily as
embedded social institutions versus understanding them
primarily as a regulated social phenomenon.34
As will be argued in this section, the contract law centered
approach that focuses primarily on the distinction between
breaches of contracts and breaches of treaties drawn by the
dualist tradition in international law, with its categorical
national/international law divide, inhibits investor-State
contracting by increasing the costs of foreign investment
activities. Umbrella clauses aim at overcoming such
impediments that stem from the limited capacity of host States
to make credible commitments under the dualist conception by
opening investor-State dispute settlement to claims for the
breach of promises of the host State vis-A-vis the foreign
investor. In terms of methodology, it is suggested that the
starting point for the legal analysis and construction of umbrella
clauses should be contract centered in stressing the economic
rationales and incentives that are at play in investor-State
cooperation and contracting, rather than taking the contract law
centered approach that interprets umbrella clauses against the
background of the abstract relationship between the
international and the domestic legal orders without taking note
that this approach can have detrimental effects for investor-
State cooperation by making it more cost-intensive.
Accordingly, this section first outlines the institutional
infrastructure that is necessary for efficient consensual
investor-State cooperation and outlines the importance of
effective dispute settlement mechanisms as a backbone for such
cooperation. Secondly, it shows that enforcement mechanisms
for host State promises are often not provided by domestic legal
syst~me de droit pour leur confdrer force juridique. ").
34. On the underlying differences in understanding contracts as legal and
social institutions and the need to combine both views, see Gunther Teubner, In the
Blind Spot: The Hybridization of Contracting, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 51
(2007); Peer Zumbansen, The Law of Society, Governance Through Contract, CLPE
Research Paper 2/2007, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=988610 (to appear in Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies).
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orders, in particular those without independent and efficient
courts, nor by the traditional system of international law with
its national/international law divide and its primary focus in
inter-State dispute resolution. Thirdly, this part argues that
even today investment treaties without umbrella clauses remain
attached to the traditional dualist vision of international law in
distinguishing between the State as a sovereign actor and its
capacity as a contractor. Consequently, even investment treaties
without an umbrella clause are often unable to promote efficient
"private ordering" between investors and host States. This
section underscores the argument that the dualist approach to
interpreting umbrella clauses disregards the importance of the
enforcement of promises for cost-efficient investor-State
cooperation.
A. EFFICIENT COOPERATION, CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS, AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF HOST STATE PROMISES
As with private parties, cooperation in investor-State
relations requires assurances that each party can rely on the
other party living up to promises made.35 Various factors play a
role in achieving compliance with the original promises.
Reputation, community pressure, the moral obligation to keep
promises, or self-interest may all contribute to this objective. In
some situations, agreements are therefore self-enforcing without
the need for any external stabilization, because the benefits
from unilaterally defecting from them will not outweigh the
benefits derived from compliance. In most cases, however,
investor-State cooperation does not fall into the category of self-
enforcing agreements. On the contrary, in the typical situation
underlying an investor-State contract the host State can benefit
by unilaterally defecting from its obligation after the investor
has completed parts of its initial performance.36
Let us, for example, assume an investor and a host State
35. See, on this and the following, Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 556-62 (2003); see also
Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 658 et seq. (1998).
For a game-theoretic reconstruction, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 185 et seq. (3d ed. 2000).
36. The underlying change in the incentive structure after one party has
started performing or placed an asset under the control of the other party is also
described as a hold-up problem. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 52 et
seq. (1987).
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have entered into a contract for the construction of a power
plant in the host country and its subsequent operation by the
investor for thirty years. Under the contract, the investor is
required to build the plant within a certain period, to operate it,
and to supply electricity. The host State, in turn, grants the
investor a thirty-year concession for the operation of the plant
and gives guarantees for the investor's tariff calculation. Based
on their mutual expectation, the contract aims at realizing gains
from cooperation: the investor intends to make profits by selling
energy; the host State expects to be supplied with energy and
benefit from the investor's know-how in constructing and
operating the plant. Yet, the investor's investment decision is
based on the expectation to earn future cash returns from the
operation of the plant and presupposes that the host State will,
inter alia, comply with its original promises not to interfere with
the tariff regime.
In economic terms, the situation of the foreign investor is
characterized by the asset or transaction specificity of the
investment. Once its obligations to construct the plant have
been fulfilled, the investor cannot simply sell the plant or the
energy to third parties or relocate the plant if the host State
does not comply with its obligations, for example by unilaterally
changing the investment contract, imposing additional
obligations on the investor, or even completely withdrawing
from its original promises in order to extract a greater benefit
from the bargain. Unlike in situations of self-enforcing
contracts, where "the threat by either party no longer to deal
with the other is sufficient in and of itself to induce
performance,'"" investor-State contracts typically involve a risk
that the host State will not abide by its original promise, but try
to "renegotiate" the original bargain or even openly breach it.
The typical situation in investor-State relations is thus prone to
be affected by opportunistic behavior of the host State with non-
recoverable, sunk costs as a consequence. Certainly, the reverse
situation of foreign investors behaving opportunistically and
attempting to renege on their original promises also exists.
However, the host State as a sovereign actor is typically able to
react to such conduct by unilaterally imposing sanctions upon
the investor and enforcing them against the assets of the
investment project.38 The fact that the host State disposes of the
37. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 35, at 557 (emphasis in the original).
38. There are exceptional situations where this mechanism does not work
effectively, for example, because the investor does not have any or sufficient assets
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sovereign power to unilaterally impose decisions on the foreign
investor structurally disfavors the investor in reacting to
opportunistic behavior of the other party in investor-State
relations.
As a consequence, the rational and risk-adverse investor
will choose not to invest at all or only invest at a higher
premium that takes into account the potential risk of the host
State reneging on its original promises. Higher costs for the
investor, which affect the price structure of foreign investment
projects and make them less cost-efficient, will be the result if
investor-State cooperation is impeded by this so-called hold-up
problem.39 While the reputation of the host State and the
political pressure exercised by other States, including the
investor's home State, might constitute some incentive for host
States to comply with promises they made vis-A-vis foreign
investors," often the only possibility for the host State to make
credible commitments and immunize investor-State cooperation
against ex post opportunistic behavior by the host State is
through the establishment of independent third-party dispute
settlement mechanisms, such as courts or arbitral tribunals.4
Such ex post control and governance mechanisms" ensure that
the initially-struck bargain will be upheld and thus empower
the parties to make credible commitments in order to engage in
cost-efficient private ordering.
B. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SHORTCOMINGS IN THE
ENFORCEMENT OF HOST STATE PROMISES
Traditionally, however, the concept of State sovereignty has
militated against the establishment of dispute settlement and
enforcement mechanisms that allowed for efficient private
ordering in investor-State relations. Sovereignty was developed
within the host State's jurisdiction. Such exceptional cases will, however, be
disregarded for the further legal analysis. They pose entirely different problems
from situations typically faced by foreign investors.
39. See supra note 36. Cf. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 35, at 561 ("[W]hen
contracts are unenforceable a sophisticated seller will refuse to produce the
specialized product, even though producing it would maximize expected surplus.").
40. Anne van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment
Protection, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008).
41. Cf. Zachary Elkins et al., Competing For Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 811, 823-24 (2006).
42. See Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance,
32 COMP. POL. STUD. 147 (1999) (outlining an understanding of third-party dispute
settlement as a mechanism of governance).
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to shield the State against interferences by other States and to
justify internally the State's power to impose binding decisions
and, if necessary, enforce them. When understood broadly as the
State's ultimate power, sovereignty clashes with the necessity
for the host State to make credible and enforceable
commitments so as to enter into binding agreements vis-A-vis
foreign investors. It constitutes an impediment to efficient
investor-State cooperation, instead of empowering States in
their relationship with foreign investors. As will be argued in
this section, effective third-party dispute settlement and
enforcement mechanisms for host State promises are often
lacking, both on the domestic level and under the traditional
customary international law framework. As will be shown, the
latter is particularly incapable of stabilizing investor-State
contracts both substantively and procedurally. Finally, this
section argues that these shortcomings can only be alleviated
imperfectly in the absence of efficient enforcement mechanisms
based on contractual arrangements between investors and host
States.
1. Enforcement of Host State Promises in Domestic Courts
The courts of the host State will often not be well positioned
to enforce the State's promises as they relate to foreign
investors. Existing or perceived bias against foreign investors,
or even the lack of an independent and efficient judiciary, may
diminish the ability of the courts of the host State to serve as
efficient and effective institutions to enforce host State promises
and counter opportunistic host State behavior. Judicial
independence is particularly compromised by close institutional
ties between courts and the executive, and missing safeguards
against political influence on court proceedings. Furthermore,
particularly in many developing countries, the low income of
judges and the insufficient financial support of courts often not
only aid and abet corruption,43 but also result in lengthy and
ineffective dispute resolution. Such factors may compromise the
ability of the host State's domestic courts to function as
independent and efficient dispute resolvers that effectively back
43. On corruption in the judiciary, see Eduardo Buscaglia & Maria Dakolias,
An Analysis of the Causes of Corruption in the Judiciary, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
95 (1999); Maria Dakolias & Kimberley Thachuk, The Problem of Eradicating
Corruption from the Judiciary: Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical
Process in Judicial Reform, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 353 (2000).
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up credible commitments of the host State vis-A-vis a foreign
investor."
The possibility of bringing a claim in the investor's home
jurisdiction or in other third-country courts is often equally
limited. Here, the concept of sovereign equality compromises
effective dispute resolution because the judiciary outside the
host State is often reluctant to subject foreign sovereigns to full-
fledged judicial scrutiny and control. Various instruments, in
particular state immunity and doctrines of judicial restraint,
such as the act of state doctrine, constitute significant limits to
subjecting foreign States to third-country jurisdiction.45
Furthermore, third-country courts often exercise judicial
restraint in view of the foreign relations interests of their own
government and are thus reluctant to subject foreign sovereigns
to full-fledged judicial scrutiny. Courts outside the host State
are, therefore, equally incapable of providing effective
enforcement mechanisms that could back up the credibility of
promises a host State makes vis-A-vis foreign investors.
44. Exceptions to these observations exist, in particular in countries with a
well-developed judicial system that provides for effective and independent protection
against government conduct. This may also account for the non-inclusion of an
investor-State dispute settlement mechanism in the recent United States-Australia
Free Trade Agreement. See William S. Dodge, Investor State Dispute Settlement
Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade
Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2006).
45. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE PURSUIT OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY, 253-301
(1986). Specifically on the situation in the United States, see Ronald Mok, Comment:
Expropriation Claims in United States Courts: The Act of State Doctrine, the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. A
Roadmap for the Expropriated Victim, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 199 (1996). Under the
U.S. act of state doctrine for example, "the Judicial Branch will not examine the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government . . . in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking
violates customary international law." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 421 (1964). The political question doctrine results in the self-restraint of
courts in the United States regarding foreign policy issues that. See Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 212 n.31 (1962) ("The conduct of the foreign relations of our
Government is committed by the Constitutions to the Executive and Legislative-
the 'political'-Departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision.") (citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
Comparable doctrines also exist under other domestic legal systems.
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2. Limited Protection of Investor-State Contracts under
Customary International Law
The concept of State sovereignty also limits the power of
customary international law to stabilize investor-State contracts
ex post. What is primarily lacking in this context is a procedural
remedy for investors to hold host States accountable in an
international forum. Instead, under the dualist conception of
international law the relationship between foreign investors and
host States is mediated through an inter-State prism that
requires investors to seek diplomatic protection on the
international level through its home State. This structure is
generally insufficient because the inter-State settlement of
investment disputes between the investor's home State and the
host State does not represent an adequate replacement for
dispute resolution directly between the foreign investor and the
host State. Apart from this procedural aspect, customary
international law is also limited as regards the substantive
protection of investor-State contracts and similar forms of
investor-State cooperation.
a. Insufficiencies of Diplomatic Protection as an Enforcement
Mechanism
International law in its positivist reading as ius inter gentes
posited that "[s]tates solely and exclusively are the subjects of
International Law. This means that the Law of Nations is a law
for the international conduct of States, and not of their
citizens."46 Obligations under international law could therefore
not exist directly in relation to a foreign investor. Instead, the
investor was originally considered to be subject only to the
municipal law of the host State.47 Accordingly, a breach of the
host State's promises was first and foremost a matter of
municipal law and did not find its direct corollary in
international law. The paradigmatic idea underlying customary
international law was rather that the violation of certain
interests of foreign nationals through certain government
actions, such as expropriatory or arbitrary conduct,48 constituted
a violation against the alien's home State.
46. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, § 13, at 18-19.
47. Attempts at the internationalization of investor-State relations only came
about at a later stage. See Weil, supra note 3, at 157-88.
48. See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the types of State conduct that
international law targeted).
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This understanding found its classical expression in the
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case where the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) contrasted the investor-
State relation with the inter-State relation and distinguished
categorically between the municipal and the international legal
order as governing the different relations: "[b]y taking up the
case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action
or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in
reality asserting its own rights-its right to ensure, in the
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international
law."49
Independent from the fact that the host State initially could
not assume obligations under international law vis-A-vis the
foreign investor in order to make credible commitments, the
system of diplomatic protection itself suffers from structural
shortcomings that disable it from efficiently stabilizing investor-
State relations ex post. First, diplomatic protection is a right of a
State to "ensure in the person of its nationals respect for the
rules of international law."5  There is, however, no
corresponding duty of the home State toward its own nationals
to grant diplomatic protection. Instead, States remain free to
exercise this right in a discretionary way.51 Furthermore,
49. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30); see also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co.
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 46-47 (Feb. 5); Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955
I.C.J. 4, 24 (April 6); Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 76, at 16; Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v.
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20, at 17 (July
12); Factory at Chorz6w (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 17, at 28 (Sept.
13) ("Rights or interests of an individual the violation of which rights causes damage
are always in a different plane to rights belonging to a State . . . . The damage
suffered by an individual is never therefore identical in kind with that which will be
suffered by a State; it can only afford a convenient scale for the calculation of the
reparation due to the State.").
50. See cases cited supra note 49.
51. See Barcelona Traction, Light And Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. at 44 ("The State
must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to
what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It retains in this respect a
discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a
political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case."); EDWIN M. BORCHARD,
THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENs ABROAD OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS, 29-30, 354, 356, 363-65 (Banks Law Publ'g Co. 1915). Likewise, most
domestic legal systems do not oblige the State to pursue claims of their nationals by
means of diplomatic protection. See Kaunda v. President of the Republic of S. Afr.,
44 Int'l L. Materials 173 (2005) (on the situation in South Africa); Abbasi v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2002) E.W.C.A. Civ. 1598 (Eng. and
Wales), 126 Int'l L. Rep. 685 (on English law); Entscheidungen des
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diplomatic protection and inter-State dispute settlement are
subject to the requirement to exhaust local remedies. 2 While
this affords the host State an opportunity to redress the
violation of rights of a foreign investor in its own courts, the rule
constitutes an impediment to efficient ex post stabilization of
investor-State contracts to the extent the host State's courts are
not impartial and independent enough in sanctioning
opportunistic behavior.53
Secondly, as a consequence "of the distinction between
domestic and international law, the home State is vested, under
international law, with exclusive control over the rights of their
nationals on the international level and is entitled to settle,
waive, or modify the rights of their nationals by an international
agreement with the host State.54 In practice, this entitlement
has led to the settlement by lump-sum agreements of
international claims concerning the violation of the rights of
foreigners.55 These agreements were used in particular to deal
with the compensatory framework in the aftermath of armed
conflicts or other large-scale events like revolutions and
traditionally fixed the compensation of foreign nationals to a
fraction of the full claim and ruled out any exceeding
compensation.
Thirdly, in view of the distinction between the rights of the
investor and the rights of its home State the entitlement to
receive compensation for the violation of international law
protecting foreign nationals is not vested in the alien but in its
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [F.R.G. Federal Constitutional Court] 55, 349
(1980), 90 Int'l Law Rep. 387 (on the situation in Germany); see also Annemarieke
Vermeer-Kiinzli, Restricting Discretion: Judicial Review of Diplomatic Protection, 75
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 279 (2006) (discussing national jurisprudence and developments
on the international level and observing an emerging development towards a State's
obligation to exercise diplomatic protection in cases of serious violation of human
rights law).
52. See CHITHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. 2005); A. A. CANCADO TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF
THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).
53. Cf. supra Part II.B.1.
54. BORCHARD, supra note 51, at 366-75; see also RUDOLF DOLZER, EIGENTUM,
ENTEIGNUNG UND ENTSCHADIGUNG IM GELTENDEN VOLKERRECHT 136-39, 147 (1985)
(arguing that human rights law restricts the home State's disposition over claims of
its nationals); JULIANE HAGELBERG, DIE VOLKERRECHTLICHE VERFOGUNGSBEFUGNIS
DES STAATES OBER RECHTSANSPRUCHE VON PRIVATPERSONEN 49-52 (2006).
55. See RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS:
THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP-SUM AGREEMENTS (1975); BURNS H. WESTON ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP-SUM AGREEMENTS 1975-95
(1999).
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home State. Compensation therefore did not have to be paid to
the investor, but to the home State that espoused the claim. 6
The home State, in turn, is under no obligation to pass the
compensation on to the investor who suffered the damage.57
Taken together, these factors illustrate the insufficiencies of
diplomatic protection as a procedural means of enforcing host
State promises vis-A-vis foreign investors and enabling host
States to make credible commitments. The insufficiencies of
diplomatic protection ultimately also explain the creation of
investor-State arbitration as a direct recourse to enforce
investor's rights against host States.
b. Insufficiencies in Substantive Stabilization of Host State
Promises
The capacity of host States to make credible foreign investor
commitments in investor-State contracts is not just limited
procedurally under customary international law. Even if an
investor managed to convince its home State to grant diplomatic
protection, customary international law only granted relief to a
limited scope of breaches of investor-State contracts and similar
instruments.58  Due to the categorical divide between
international law and municipal law, the host State's violation
of an obligation under an investor-State contract did not directly
correspond to a violation of an obligation under international
law, as the investor was not a subject of international law and
the investor's home State not a party to the contract. This
categorical distinction between the breach of the investor-State
contract and the breach of international law was difficult to
bridge under the traditional dualist conception. Furthermore,
the host State, as the sovereign over the contract's governing
law, was generally considered to be entitled to change it.59
56. BORCHARD, supra note 51, at 356-59, 383-88; HAGELBERG, supra note 52,
at 51.
57. See HAGELBERG, supra note 54, at 51 n.ll0, for further references.
58. See, e.g., Robert Y. Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 156 (1961) (qualifying the debate as characterized by a "difference of
opinion about basic principles which has hitherto rendered abortive the most
strenuous efforts to systematize this part of the law"); Jean-Flavien Lalive, Contrats
entre etats ou entreprises itatiques et personnes prives, 181 RECUEIL DES COURS
[RdC] 9 (1983); Charles Leben, La thdorie du contrat d'Etat et l'1volution du droit
international des investissements, 302 RDC 197 (2004); Mann, supra note 32, at 574-
77; Weil, supra note 3.
59. Mann, supra note 32, at 581 ("Contracts are governed by the law
determined by the private international law of the forum. That law 'not merely
[Vol. 18:1
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Accordingly, "[i]f under the latter system of law [i.e. municipal
law] no breach of contract occurs, it is not open to public
international law to assert the contrary."6
Despite the categorical divide between municipal and
international law, contract claims and treaty claims, customary
international law settled on an intermediary position that
afforded some limited protection to investor-State contracts.
Due to the lack of reciprocity of international law obligations
between the host State and the foreign investor, the solution
under customary international law was that a breach of an
investor-State contract, while in itself unable to constitute a
breach of international law, could constitute a violation of an
inter-State obligation so long as the breach of contract also
constituted a tort with respect to the investor's home State."
Such torts could exist in cases in which a host State
expropriated an investor-State contract,62 interfered with the
contract in an arbitrary manner, 63 or committed an independent
breach of international law through a denial of justice,' always
provided that the conduct of the State was noncommercial in
character.65
A simple commercial breach of an investor-State contract by
the host State was, by contrast, considered as insufficient in
order to result in a violation of international law, since such a
breach exclusively concerned the contractual bond, without
touching on the international relations between States.66 In
sum, the position under customary international law was the
sustains but, because it sustains, may also modify or dissolve the contractual bond.'
... If, therefore, the debtor relies on changes in the proper law, he does what he is
entitled to do and cannot be charged with a breach of contract, his undertaking
being limited to perform in accordance with the terms of the contract as sanctioned
by the provisions of the proper law.").
60. Id. at 582.
61. See Weil, supra note 3, at 137 ("la responsabilit6 de l'Etat nait en matibre
contractuelle d'6l6ments ext6rieurs au contrat, constitutifs en eux-m~mes d'un d~lit
international").
62. See Jennings, supra note 58, at 173-79 (referencing the relevant case law).
63. Id. at 165.
64. See generally JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005).
65. See Stephan M. Schwebel, On Whether the Breach by a State of a Contract
with an Alien Is a Breach of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE TIME
OF ITS CODIFICATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERTO AGO, 401, 410-11 (1987)
(providing case law of international tribunals endorsing this view).
66. Weil, supra note 3, at 138 ("inex6cution [du contrat] ne constitue jamais per
se un acte contraire au droit international, et il faut toujours quelque chose de plus
et d'autre pour qu'il y ait un acte internationalement illicite").
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following:
[W]hile mere breach by a State of a contract with an alien (whose
proper law is not international law) is not a violation of international
law, a "non-commercial" act of a State contrary to such a contract may
be. That is to say, the breach of such a contract by a State in ordinary
commercial intercourse is not, in the predominant view, a violation of
international law, but the use of the sovereign authority of a State,
contrary to the expectations of the parties, to abrogate or violate a
contract with an alien, is a violation of international law.
67
This limited scope of protection of investor-State contracts
under customary international law leaves important gaps in
stabilizing investor-State relations ex post against breaches of
contract and thus limits the scope of the host State's capacity to
make credible commitments and participate in efficient
investor-State cooperation. Apart from disputes regarding
changes in the governing law caused by the host State's
sovereign conduct, disputes about the proper scope of a
contractual obligation as well as disputes involving the simple
nonperformance of contractual obligations outside the State's
sovereign conduct were disregarded by the scope of
international law. Customary international law therefore not
only left islands of non-protection against the change of law by
the host State; it also failed to protect against (alleged) breaches
based on the opportunistic behavior arising out of the host
State's commercial conduct.
3. Insufficiencies of Alternative Investment Protection under
Investor-State Agreements
Certainly, large-scale investment contracts have always
contained contractual arbitration clauses as well as choice of
law clauses subjecting a contract to a foreign law as governing
the contractual relations,68 stabilization clauses that isolate an
investor-State contract from future changes of the law
governing a contract,6 9 or internationalization clauses that
67. Schwebel, supra note 65, at 408-09.
68. The choice of a foreign law is often used in contracts involving foreign debt
where States regularly subject bonds to one of the laws in force at the locations of
the principle financial centers, such as New York, London, Frankfurt, or Paris.
69. Specifically on stabilization clauses, see HANNO MERKT,
INVESTITIONSSCHUTZ DURCH STABILISIERUNGSKLAUSELN (1990); F. V. Garcia-
Amador, State Responsibility in Case of "Stabilization" Clauses, 2 TRANSNAT'L. L. &
POLY 23 (1993). On choice of law and internationalization clauses in investor-State
contracts see KARL-HEINZ BOCKSTIEGEL, DER STAAT ALS VERTRAGSPARTNER
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subject a contract to international law as the governing law. By
means of such contractual arrangements, investors and States
were able to deal with some of the problems arising out of the
national/international law divide under customary international
law and the difficulties of host States to make credible and
enforceable commitments vis-A-vis foreign investors absent
effective third-party dispute settlement and enforcement
mechanisms. Arbitration clauses removed the settlement of
disputes from the realm of domestic adjudication and alleviated
the deficiencies existing in this respect;" choice of law clauses,
stabilization clauses, and internationalization clauses, in turn,
constitute a contractual solution to protect investor-State
contracts against unilateral changes in the governing law by the
host State that might affect the contractual equilibrium.7'
Nevertheless, purely contractual arrangements have
significant drawbacks compared to a permanent institutional
structure that provides for dispute settlement and enforcement
of host State promises vis-A-vis foreign investors in general as it
is done under modern investment treaties.72 Above all, in the
absence of permanent dispute settlement and enforcement
mechanisms, investor-State cooperation constantly requires
negotiation about such mechanisms-negotiations that are not
only time-consuming, but make the enforceability of the host
State's promise itself part of the bargaining mass-making not
only the negotiations but the entire investment cooperation less
efficient.
Furthermore, while large-scale multinational firms may
prove quite successful in such negotiations, even to a point
where it makes no difference whether investment protection is
offered by an international treaty or by the contractual
framework set out in an investor-State contract, the situation
for middle or even small-scale foreign investors is different.
They may not have the necessary market and bargaining power
to negotiate comparable protection mechanisms. Smaller
investors are thus placed at a structural disadvantage compared
to larger investors because the host State commitments in
relation to them may be less credible due to the absence of pre-
AUSLANDISCHER PRIVATUNTERNEHMEN 76-144 (Athenaum Verlag 1971).
70. See supra Part I.B.l.a.
71. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
72. See Barton Legum, The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration under
NAFTA, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 531 (2002) (discussing the differences between State
consent in modern investment treaties and more classical cases).
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existing institutional backups for private ordering between
foreign investors and States. Consequently, smaller investors
are less likely to make foreign investments because the risk
associated with the lack of enforceable commitments on behalf
of the host State is too high." In any case, the lack of a non-
contractual structure to stabilize investor-State cooperation ex
post and ensure the enforceability of host State promises will
make the investments more expensive, not only for the investor,
but also for the host State and its constituency. The investments
are more expensive because the investor's goods and services
will be offered at a higher price. From a macroeconomic
perspective, contractual arrangements between investors and
host States will not be able to make up for the limited capacity
of States to make credible and enforceable commitments in
investor-State relations.
C. THE LIMITED PROTECTION OF INVESTOR-STATE CONTRACTS
UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES
As long as host States did not consider foreign investment
an important factor for their economy, the inability (or
unwillingness) of States to make credible commitments vis-a-vis
foreign investors was of little concern. Once attracting foreign
investment became desirable, however, the monolithic
conception of State sovereignty developed into a drawback, since
it vitiated the capacity of host States to make credible
contractual commitments with respect to foreign investors, both
procedurally as well as regarding the substantive stability of the
law governing investor-State relations. Consequently, an
incongruity emerged between the need for and the desirability
of foreign investment and the legal protection of foreign
investment under traditional international law. It is against
this background that the institutionalization of investor-State
dispute settlement has to be viewed.7 4 By allowing foreign
investors to have direct recourse to dispute settlement against
the host State and enforce the State's promises, host States are
able to make credible commitments vis-a-vis foreign investors,75
thereby reducing the costs of foreign investments and rendering
73. See supra Part II.A.
74. Cf. Sweet, supra note 42, at 160 ("[W]hen existing rules cannot sustain
social exchange at an optimal level, people have an interest in developing new
ones.").
75. Cf. Elkins et al., supra note 41, at 823-24.
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investor-State cooperation more efficient.
However, even under modern investment treaties the scope
of the host State's incapacity to make credible commitments
under investor-State contracts persists. Although these treaties
provide for a number of specific investors' rights, such as fair
and equitable treatment and the protection against
expropriation, and contain the host State's general and advance
consent to arbitration, the protection of contractual promises is
still limited in the absence of an umbrella clause. In particular,
fair and equitable treatment and the concept of expropriation,
both direct and indirect, are interpreted in arbitral practice as
being limited to breaches of a sovereign nature, thus excluding
commercial State conduct. The traditional contract claim/treaty
claim distinction therefore persists in investment treaty
arbitration and limits the host State's capacity to fully make
credible commitments under treaties that do not contain an
umbrella clause. The contract claim/treaty claim distinction
plays out on two levels: the jurisdiction of treaty-based tribunals
for breaches of investor-State contracts and their substantive
protection.
With respect to jurisdiction, arbitral tribunals consistently
differentiate between contract and treaty claims. The tribunals
support the holding that contract claims are, in principle,
excluded from the jurisdiction of treaty-based tribunals.76 The
Annulment Committee in Aguas del Aconquija v. Argentina, for
example, explained:
A state may breach a treaty without breaching a contract, and vice
versa .... In accordance with this general principle (which is
undoubtedly declaratory of general international law), whether there
has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of
contract are different questions. Each of these claims will be
determined by reference to its own proper or applicable law-in the
case of the BIT, by international law; in the case of the Concession
Contract, by the proper law of the contract.
77
Arbitral tribunals have applied this distinction consistently.
The result is the "well established" jurisprudence 78 that a
76. Exceptions to this principle exist, independently of the existence of an
umbrella clause, if the treaty includes a broadly worded arbitration clause covering
"any disputes relating to investments." See infra Part 1II.B.2.
77. Compafiia de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, paras. 95-
96 (July 3, 2002).
78. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 148
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simple, commercial breach of an investor-State contract per se
does not involve the breach of an investment treaty provision
and is thus excluded from the jurisdiction of treaty-based
tribunals.79 With respect to jurisdiction for contract claims,
investment tribunals have, therefore, adopted a State-friendly
application of the State's consent to arbitration, and grounded
this view on traditional notions of the municipal/international
law divide. From the perspective of effective ex post stabilization
of investor-State contracts this jurisprudence did, however,
leave gaps of protection, notably with regard to non-sovereign
breaches of host State promises vis-A-vis investors.
Similar to the jurisdictional implications of the contract
claim/treaty claim distinction, the difference between sovereign
interference and commercial conduct also affects the substantive
protection accorded to investor-State contracts under
(Nov. 14, 2005).
79. See id.; Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 114 (Oct. 21, 2005);
Camuzzi Int'l S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/7,
Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 61 et seq. (June 10, 2005); AES Corporation v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction,
para. 94 (May 26, 2005); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, para. 299 (May 12, 2005); Sempra Energy
International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision
on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 95 (May 11, 2005); Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on
Jurisdiction, para. 219 (Apr. 22, 2005); Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 174 (Aug. 3, 2004);
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction - Ancillary Claim, paras. 49
and 51 (Aug. 2, 2004); PSEG Global Inc., North American Coal Corp., and Konya
Ilgin Elektrik Oretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/02/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 158 (June 4, 2004); Enron
Corporation and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 91 (Jan. 14, 2004); Azurix Corp.
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on
Jurisdiction, para. 81 (Dec. 8, 2003); SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v.
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on
Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 147 (Aug. 6, 2003); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Republic of Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections
to Jurisdiction, paras. 72, 76, 80 (July 17, 2003). Cf. Joy Mining Machinery Limited
v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/11, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 71-
82 (July 30, 2004); SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the
Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction, para. 154 (Jan. 29, 2004); Alex Genin Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and
A.S. Baltoil v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/99/2, Award,
para. 319 (June 25, 2001); Eureko, Partial Award, supra note 6, para. 112. See
generally Guido Santiago Tawil, The Distinction Between Contract Claims and
Treaty Claims: An Overview, in 14 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 492 (2006).
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investment treaties. Even though a "treaty cause of action is not
the same as a contractual cause of action","° investment
tribunals have accepted that certain interferences of the host
State with investor-State contracts can give rise to treaty claims
for violation of the concept of indirect expropriation or the fair
and equitable treatment standard."'
However, tribunals interpret these investors' rights as only
protecting against sovereign, not commercial breaches. The
Tribunal in CMS v. Argentina, for example, supported that
[tihe standard of protection of the treaty will be engaged only when
there is a specific breach of treaty rights and obligations or a violation
of contract rights protected under the treaty. Purely commercial
aspects of a contract might not be protected by the treaty in some
situations, but the protection is likely to be available when there is
significant interference by governments or public agencies with the
rights of the investor.
8 2
Likewise, the Tribunal in Impregilo v. Pakistan, a case
involving the breach of an investment contract, emphasized that
"only measures taken by Pakistan in the exercise of its
sovereign power ('puissance publique'), and not decisions taken
in the implementation or performance of the Contracts, may be
considered as measures having an effect equivalent to
expropriation." 3 Similarly, the Tribunal in Consortium RFCC v.
Morocco stressed that a violation of fair and equitable treatment
required conduct by the host State in exercise of sovereign
power.84  Indirect expropriation and fair and equitable
80. Aguas del Aconquija, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, at para. 113.
81. See, e.g., SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, at para. 162;
Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, paras. 98 and 134 (Oct. 11, 2002) (both tribunals asserting
that a breach of contract may result in a breach of treaty without, however,
establishing criteria for the distinction).
82. CMS Gas Transmission, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, at para. 299.
83. Impregilo, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17 at para. 281; accord Consortium
RFCC v. Morocco, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/6, Award, paras. 63-69 (Dec.
22, 2003) (stating with respect to indirect expropriation that "[plour qu'il y ait droit
A compensation il faut que la personne de l'expropri6 prouve qu'il a tA l'objet de
mesures prises par rEtat agissant non comme cocontractant mais comme autorit
publique").
84. Consortium RFCC, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, at para. 51 ("L'Etat, ou son
emanation, peuvent s'6tre comport~s comme des cocontractants ordinaries ayant une
divergence d'approche, en fait ou en droit, avec linvestisseur. Pour que la violation
all~gu~e du contrat constitute un traitement injuste ou inequitable au sens de
l'Accord bilateral, il faut qu'elle rsulte d'un comportement exorbitant de celui qu'un
contractant ordinaire pourrait adopter."); accord Bayindir, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/29, at para. 180 et seq.; Salini Costruttori S.p.A & Italstrade S.p.A. v.
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on
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treatment, therefore, only protect investor-State contracts and
similar instruments against interferences based on sovereign
conduct of the host State. Purely commercial breaches, by
contrast, are in principle not covered under the substantive
provisions of an investment treaty.
Sovereign conduct is also necessary in order to find direct
expropriation. The Tribunal in SGS v. Philippines, for instance,
held that "a mere refusal to pay a debt is not an expropriation of
property."85 Similarly, the Tribunal in Waste Management v.
Mexico noted that the foreign investor could not bring an
expropriation claim for the simple nonpayment of money owed
to him by a Mexican municipality under a concession
agreement. The Tribunal noted:
In such cases, simply to assert that 'property rights are created under
and by virtue of a contract' is not sufficient. The mere non-performance
of a contractual obligation is not to be equated with a taking of
property, nor (unless accompanied by other elements) is it tantamount
to expropriation. Any private party can fail to perform its contracts,
whereas nationalization and expropriation are inherently
governmental acts, as is envisaged by the use of the term 'measure' in
Article 1110(1).86
None of the cases that required sovereign conduct as
essential for the breach of an investment treaty involved a
treaty with an umbrella clause. Instead, the Tribunal in Waste
Management v. Mexico even emphasized the lack of an umbrella
clause in NAFTA in order to support its conclusion with an e
contrario argument. Noting that NAFTA Chapter 11, "unlike
many bilateral and regional investment treaties.., does [not]
contain an 'umbrella clause' committing the host state to comply
with its contractual commitments,"87 the Tribunal implied that
the existence of an umbrella clause would have changed the
legal assessment of the case and covered the simple non-
performance of a contractual obligation.
Jurisdiction, para. 154 (Nov. 29, 2004).
85. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, at para. 161.
86. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3,
Award, para. 174 (Apr. 30, 2004); see also Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of
Lithuania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, para. 443 (Sept. 11, 2007);
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12, Award,
para. 315 (July 14, 2006); Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, para. 20-30 (Sept. 16, 2003); Impregilo, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/17, at para. 278. Cf. EnCana Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador (Canada v.
Ecuador), LCIA Case No. UN3481, UNCITRAL, Award of Feb. 3, 2006, paras. 193-
94 (concerning direct expropriation requiring a final exercise of sovereign power).
87. Waste Mgmt., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, at para. 73.
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In sum, arbitral jurisprudence draws the distinction
between contract claims and treaty claims with respect to the
concepts of fair and equitable treatment and indirect
expropriation based on whether the conduct of the host State is
of a governmental or sovereign nature, or whether it was of a
purely commercial character and could have equally been
performed by a private party. Therefore, in cases of simple
breaches of investor-State contracts that do not amount in
themselves to a breach of indirect expropriation or fair and
equitable treatment, international investment treaties without
umbrella clauses and the dualist conception of international law
still limit the capacity of States to fully make credible
commitments concerning their future ability and willingness to
live up to their contractual obligations vis-,i-vis foreign
investors.
III. UMBRELLA CLAUSES AS AN ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISM FOR HOST STATE PROMISES
Investment treaties without umbrella clauses still leave
sufficiently wide gaps for opportunistic breaches of investor-
State contracts that cannot be efficiently enforced in
international or domestic fora. As a consequence, it is submitted
that the inclusion of umbrella clauses in investment treaties
constitutes a reaction to the insufficiencies in protection of
investor-State contracts against non-sovereign breaches under
customary international law and investment treaty concepts
such as indirect expropriation and fair and equitable treatment.
Umbrella clauses, it is argued, intend to remedy this blind spot
by providing a mechanism to make host State promises
enforceable and immune against ex post opportunistic behavior
in general, comprising not only cases of unilateral change of the
governing law of the investor-State contract by the host State,
but also regarding circumstances that are often viewed as
simple contractual disputes. Opportunistic behavior may occur
in the form of simple non-performance of contractual obligations
by the host State contrary to the governing law. Opportunistic
behavior may further occur when the host State takes
advantage in bad faith of ambiguities or gaps in the contract.
Finally, the regulation of contracts or contract law may have
consequences that constitute an opportunistic escape from the
2009]
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host State's original promise."
The capacity to make credible commitments can be limited
not only by a lack of enforcement regarding interferences with
investor-State contracts based on the prerogatives of the host
State as a sovereign; it can also be affected by enforcement
limitations in regard to purely commercial interferences with
investor-State contracts. It is therefore submitted that umbrella
clauses must be seen as an enforcement mechanism for host
State promises in general, independent of whether the host
State has acted in its function as a sovereign or as a merchant.
Accordingly, this section argues that umbrella clauses aim at
empowering host States comprehensively in their contractual
relationship with foreign investors in order for them to make
credible commitments and thus comprehensively allow for
private ordering of investor-State relations and efficient
investor-State cooperation.
The primary function of umbrella clauses thus consists of
remedying the loopholes the dualist framework has created in
the enforcement of host State promises. In this sense, the
clauses are portrayed as breaking with the dualist framework
by establishing jurisdiction of treaty-based tribunals for claims
that originate in breaches of municipal law, independent of
whether these breaches are of a sovereign or a commercial
nature. Not only can this view be supported within the structure
and the objective of investment treaties; a broad understanding
of umbrella clauses is also in accordance with the fundamental
structure of international law. While a broad understanding of
umbrella clauses breaks with the rigidity that some
commentators and tribunals attach to the dualist conception of
international law with its national/international law divide and
the contract claim/treaty claim distinction, it does not break
with the tradition and structure of international law as such.
Instead this subsection also shows that there are manifold
examples of pure contract claims in the international law realm.
Finally, the historic emergence of umbrella clauses since the
1950s suggests a broad understanding covering both sovereign
and commercial breaches of investor-State contracts.
88. See Mann, supra note 32, at 574-75, for a discussion of these four different
types of disputes concerning an investor-State contract.
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A. BREACHES OF A SOVEREIGN NATURE VERSUS COMMERCIAL
BREACHES
The view that umbrella clauses only protect against
breaches of contracts based on sovereign conduct or the abuse of
governmental power has only found support in more recent
scholarship 9 and particularly in two recent ICSID decisions in
related cases decided by the same set of arbitrators. In El Paso
v. Argentina and Pan American v. Argentina, the Tribunals held
that it was "necessary to distinguish the State as a merchant
from the State as a sovereign"9 in the context of applying the
umbrella clause. In El Paso the Tribunal considered that:
the umbrella clause in Article II of the BIT... will not extend the
Treaty protection to breaches of an ordinary commercial contract
entered into by the State or a State-owned entity, but will cover
additional investment protections contractually agreed by the State as
a sovereign-such as a stabilization clause-inserted in an investment
agreement.
9
'
89. See Francesco Costamagna, Investor' [sic] Rights and State Regulatory
Autonomy: the Role of the Legitimate Expectation Principle in the CMS v. Argentina
case, 3 TRANSNAT'L DIsP. MGMT. 10 (2006) (observing that the Tribunal's "finding
provides further authority to the suggestion that umbrella clauses exclusively apply
to governmental activities iure imperii"); Richard Happ, Dispute Settlement under
the Energy Charter Treaty, 45 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 331, 347-53 (2002) (discussing
the minimum governmental measures that a State, as a sovereign entity, must take
to ensure fair and equitable treatment and non-discrimination); Richard Happ &
Noah Rubins, Awards and Decisions of ICSID (W. Bank) Tribunals in 2004, 47
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 878, 921 (2004) ("[Tjhere appears to be growing support for
the notion that before a breach of contract will amount to a breach of an investment
treaty, the state must have acted in the exercise of its sovereign powers, rather than
as an 'ordinary' contractual partner."); Thomas W. Wilde, Investment Arbitration
under the Energy Charter: An Overview of Selected Key Issues based on Recent
Litigation Experience, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 193 (Norbert
Horn ed., 2004); Walde, Contract Claims, supra note 8; Thomas W. Wdlde & Kaj
Hob~r, The First Energy Charter Treaty Arbitral Award, 22 J. INT'L ARB. 83, 94
(2005) (noting that the SGS v. Philippines tribunal avoided the question of whether
"commitments to be observed" meant "investment contracts" with the State); Wdlde,
"Umbrella Clause" in Investment Arbitration, supra note 4, at 196 ("[D]isputes over
contracts that display merely commercial- and contract-law elements will not fall
under international law; such disputes do not involve the power of government...
.11).
90. Pan American Energy LLC, and BP Argentina Exploration Co. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/13, and BP America Production Co.,
Pan American Sur SRL, Pan American Fueguina, SRL and Pan American
Continental SRL v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/8
(consolidated claims), Decision on Preliminary Objections, para. 108 (July 27, 2006);
El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 79 (Apr. 27, 2006).
91. El Paso, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, at para. 81; see also Sempra Energy
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As a consequence, the Tribunal considered that simple contract
breaches could not be brought under the applicable treaty. It
reasoned:
In the Tribunal's view, this umbrella clause does not extend its
jurisdiction over any contract claims that the Claimants might present
as stemming solely from the breach of a contract between the investor
and the Argentine State or an Argentine autonomous entity. Moreover,
in the Tribunal's view, it is especially clear that the umbrella clause
does not extend [its jurisdiction] to any contract claims when such
claims do not rely on a violation of the standards of protection of the
BIT, namely, national treatment, MFN clause, fair and equitable
treatment, full protection and security, protection against arbitrary
and discriminatory measures, protection against expropriation or
nationalisation either directly or indirectly, unless some requirements
are respected.92
The Tribunal further considered in Pan American that "the
'umbrella clause' does not add anything in terms of the
Tribunal's competence... ."' Similarly, in Sempra Energy v.
Argentina, the Tribunal was of the view that:
[t]he decisions dealing with the issue of the umbrella clause and the
role of contracts in a Treaty context have all distinguished breaches of
contract from Treaty breaches on the basis of whether the breach has
arisen from the conduct of an ordinary contract party, or rather
involves a kind of conduct that only a sovereign State function or
power could effect.
94
Other tribunals, by contrast, reject the distinction between
commercial conduct and conduct & titre de souverain in the
context of umbrella clauses. Although most cases concerning the
violation of an umbrella clause did involve sovereign conduct,
they did not require this as a constitutive element. The Tribunal
in Eureko v. Poland, for example, explicitly rejected the
contention that a distinction should be made between
Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, para. 109
(Sept. 28, 2007) (without, however, mentioning stabilization clauses as an example
of the special contractual clauses the tribunal in El Paso had in mind).
92. Pan American (consolidated claims), at para. 112; El Paso, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/15, at para. 84.
93. Pan American (consolidated claims), at para. 114.
94. Sempra Energy, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, at para. 310; see also CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, para. 299 (May 12, 2005) ("The standard of protection of the treaty will be
engaged only when there is a specific breach of treaty rights and obligations or a
violation of contract rights protected under the treaty. Purely commercial aspects of
a contract might not be protected by the treaty in some situations, but the protection
is likely to be available when there is significant interference by governments or
public agencies with the rights of the investor.").
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governmental acts (acta iure imperii) and commercial acts (acta
iure gestiones) of a State in connection with the application of an
umbrella clause.95
The view that umbrella clauses protect against only
governmental breaches is, however, unconvincing for a number
of reasons. Apart from practical difficulties in distinguishing
between governmental and purely commercial conduct,96 the
distinction, above all, disregards the importance of third-party
dispute settlement for efficient investor-State cooperation and
contracting. It disregards that, in order to make credible
commitments, host State promises need to be protected not only
against opportunistic behavior in the form of sovereign conduct,
but also against breaches of a commercial character.
Furthermore, the inclusion of an umbrella clause in an
investment treaty would be wholly superfluous since restrictions
on the sovereign conduct of States, including their effect on
investor-State contracts, are already established by other
investors' rights, in particular the concepts of indirect
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment. 7 Instead, the
95. Eureko, Partial Award, supra note 6, paras. 115-34; see also Duke Energy
Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, para. 325 (Aug. 18, 2008) (suggesting that commercial
conduct, such as delays in performing contractual obligations, delays in paying
interest, and the poor implementation of a contract are sufficient to result in the
violation of an umbrella clause); Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, para. 51, para. 82 (Oct. 12, 2005) (discussing questions
of attribution in the context of a claim based, inter alia, on a violation of an umbrella
clause). Similarly, the requirement of governmental conduct was rejected by a
number of commentators. See Ben Hamida, supra note 4, at 6 ("Ces trait6s ne
distinguent pas entre les deux cat6gories de contrats. Ils s'appliquent aux
investisseurs et aux investissements, notions entendues largement. Par ailleurs, une
telle distinction est difficile AL mettre en oeuvre au vu des controverses qui entourent
l'identification du contrat d'Etat."); Kunoy, supra note 4, at 291-93; Schramke,
supra note 4, at 22-23; Zolia, supra note 4, at 34-36. Cf. Grigera Naon, Les contrats
d'Etat: quelques reflexions, 3 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 667, 686 (2003) ("Les violations
d'un BIT sont attribu6es A lEtat signataire dans la mesure off, selon le droit
international, 'activit6 des divisions politiques, autorit6s, organes ou entit~s qu'il
contr6le ou administre lui est imputable, ce qui peut arriver m~me pour leur activit6
iure gestionis.").
96. See, e.g., Noble Ventures, ICSID Case No.ARB/01/11, at para. 82 (noting
that there is a "widespread consensus" that there is no common understanding of
what a public act is); Gill et al., supra note 1, at 407 (pointing to practical
difficulties). But see Wdlde, Contract Claims, supra note 8 (specifying criteria for the
distinction, while recognizing that drawing the distinction is "no easy task").
97. Cf. Gaffney & Loftis, supra note 4, at 12; Zolia, supra note 4, at 34-35
("Breaches of contract that are motivated by non-commercial considerations create
international state responsibility even in the absence of an 'umbrella clause'.
Therefore, as a matter of logic, 'umbrella clauses' should offer a broader protection
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principle of effective interpretation mandates interpreting
umbrella clauses so as to give them their proper scope of
application, rather than to make them effectively superfluous. 8
Certainly, if umbrella clauses are "meant to add something to-
rather than subtract something from-the protection otherwise
enjoyed by contracts of investors with governments under
customary international law and the earlier investment
disciplines,"99 an interpretation limiting the clauses to breaches
of investor-State contracts by governmental conduct is not
convincing. Instead, replicating categories that govern the
interpretation of investment treaty standards such as fair and
equitable treatment or indirect expropriation in the
interpretation of umbrella clauses-namely the distinction
between governmental and commercial conduct, between
contract claim and treaty claim-is an exercise that excludes
any autonomous scope of application of an umbrella clause.00
Conversely, the application of umbrella clauses to any type
of breach of a host State promise, whether governmental or
commercial, does not make other substantive obligations of
investment treaties "substantially superfluous," as the
Tribunals in SGS v. Pakistan and El Paso v. Argentina
argued.' In the view of the Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan, a
broad interpretation of umbrella clauses would relieve investors
of the "need to demonstrate a violation of those substantive
treaty standards if a simple breach of contract, or of municipal
against all breaches, whether governmental or not.").
98. Noble Ventures, ICSID Case No.ARB/OI11, at paras. 50-52; SGS Soci6t6
G6n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 116 (Jan. 29, 2004);
Eureko, Partial Award, supra note 6, paras. 248-49. See Asian Agric. Products Ltd.
(AAPL) v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/8713, Award, para. 40 (June 27, 1990), on the doctrine of effective
interpretation of international treaties, specifically in the investment treaty context.
Nothing is better settled, as a canon of interpretation in all systems
of law, than that a clause must be so interpreted as to give it a
meaning rather than so as to deprive it of meaning. This is simply
an application of the wider legal principle of 'effectiveness' which
requires favouring the interpretation that gives to each treaty
provision 'effet utile'.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
99. Wilde, "Umbrella Clause" in Investment Arbitration, supra note 4, at 206
(reaching, however, the contrary conclusion to the one suggested in the present
article).
100. See cases cited supra notes 80-87.
101. SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01113, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para.
168 (Aug. 6, 2003).
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statute or regulation, by itself, would suffice to constitute a
treaty violation on the part of a Contracting Party and engage
the international responsibility of the Party."'' 2
Likewise, the Tribunal in El Paso v. Argentina considered
that:
it would be sufficient to include a so-called "umbrella clause" and a
dispute settlement mechanism, and no other articles setting standards
for the protection of foreign investment in any BIT. If any violation of
any legal obligation of a State is ipso facto a violation of the treaty,
then that violation needs not amount to a violation of the high
standards of the treaty of "fair and equitable treatment" or "full
protection and security." 103
The Tribunal's argument disregards that other investors'
rights-including fair and equitable treatment, indirect
expropriation, and nondiscrimination--concern obligations of
host States that are normally not addressed by investor-State
contracts." Host States usually do not promise, for example,
nondiscrimination in contracts. Already from this point of view,
umbrella clauses do not make other investors' rights
superfluous. The argument further disregards that not all
foreign investment projects are based on a contract between a
foreign investor and a host State. Instead, foreign investment
also takes place by the unfolding of economic activity on the
basis of the host State's general legislation or by capital
investment in foreign companies. These types of investments
are therefore not covered by the scope of application of umbrella
clauses because no investor-State contracts or similar
instruments serve as a basis of the investor's economic activity.
In fact, these types of foreign investments regularly generate
investment treaty disputes that are exclusively concerned with
the conformity of changes in the host State's general regulatory
framework or administrative conduct and do not involve
breaches of promises made vis-A-vis the foreign investor."5
102. Id.
103. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 76 (Apr. 27, 2006).
104. Schreuer, supra note 4, at 253; see also Eureko, supra note 6, para. 258
("[R]eliance by the Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan on the maxim in dubio mitius so as
to effectively presume that sovereign rights override the rights of a foreign investor
could be seen as a reversion to a doctrine that has been displaced by contemporary
customary international law ....").
105. See generally International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. The United
Mexican States, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Arbitral Award (Jan. 26, 2006) (alleging that
Mexico breached its NAFTA obligations); Methanex Corp. v. United States of
America, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Final Award (Aug. 3, 2005) (alleging that the United
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Finally, the distinction between commercial and sovereign
conduct is also unconvincing from an economic perspective. In
fact, compliance with the host State's original promises vis-A-vis
a foreign investor can be as effectively eviscerated by changing
the governing law of an investor-State contract as by the bad
faith reliance on ambiguities of the contract in question, the
outright refusal to pay, or similar commercial breaches. From
an economic perspective that views the performance of a
contract in terms of the gains from cooperation, distinguishing
between breaches of a commercial and a governmental nature is
therefore not very convincing, as the effects can be equally
destructive for the contractual equilibrium. In both cases of
commercial or sovereign conduct, the lack of third-party dispute
settlement can prevent States from making credible
commitments in investor-State contracts and thus increase the
costs of investor-State cooperation. It is thus difficult to justify
why a dispute about the interpretation of a contractual clause
that is decisive as to whether a party has to pay several millions
of dollars should be a matter outside the scope of international
dispute settlement and investment treaty arbitration, while the
confiscation of an automobile, a thoroughbred horse, two
Kashan carpets and other household items, a Rolex watch and
other jewelry with a combined net worth of only a few tens of
thousands of dollars would be within the limits of traditional
international law dispute resolution."6
In a slightly different context, international law takes the
same perspective on the indistinguishability between
governmental and commercial conduct, namely as regards the
States breached its NAFTA obligations); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada,
UNICTRAL/NAFTA Final Award (Dec. 30, 2002) (alleging that Canada breached its
NAFTA obligations); Methanex Corp. v. United States of America,
UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Partial Award (Aug. 7, 2002); Middle East Cement Shipping
and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/99/6, Award, (Apr. 12, 2002) (involving Egypt withholding approval to re-export
assets, in violation of Egypt's own investment law); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada,
UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000); Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v.
Republic of Zaire, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, (Feb. 21, 1997)
(involving Zaire not fulfilling its obligations of protection in violation of a BIT);
Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003) (alleging that the United States
breached its NAFTA obligations); Asian Agric. Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/87/3, Award (June
27, 1990) (alleging that Sri Lanka did not fulfill its security obligations under a
BIT).
106. See Leonard and Mavis Daley v. Iran, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 232, 234-
36 (1989).
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rules on attribution of conduct to the State under the
international law rules on State responsibility." 7 For instance,
with respect to the conduct of a State organ under Art. 4 of the
International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility, the relevance of the distinction between
commercial and sovereign acts has been expressly denied by the
Commission. As the official commentary on the Articles states:
"[i]t is irrelevant for the purposes of attribution that the conduct
of a State organ may be classified as 'commercial' or as 'acta iure
gestionis.''' '" The commentary further stresses that "entry into
or breach of a contract by a State organ is nonetheless an act of
the State for the purposes of article 4, " 1°9 just as traditional
sovereign conduct is.
Presumably, the idea underlying the distinction between
governmental and commercial conduct is that only sovereign
breaches of an investor-State contract constitute a political risk,
whereas commercial breaches are equally possible when
contracting with a private actor and thus do not increase the
risk of contracting with a sovereign. 1 Yet the difference
between the host State and normal private parties, even as
regards commercial breaches, is that the latter are not their
own judges in their own courts. Unlike private parties, the host
State is able to control the way the law is applied by its own
courts and is therefore not able to provide independent third-
party dispute settlement that would enable it to make credible
commitments.'" The situation between contracts between
private parties and investor-State contracts is, therefore, not
comparable."2
Interpreting umbrella clauses restrictively does not only
107. See also James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration,
TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT., Jan. 2008, at 6-7.
108. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY, 96 (2002).
109. Id. (citing Swedish Engine Drivers Union Case, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
14 (1976); Schmidt and Dahlstr6m, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1976)). The ILC
commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility further adds that "[t]he
irrelevance of the classification of the acts of State organs as iure imperii or iure
gestionis was affirmed by all those members of the Sixth Committee who responded
to a specific question on this issue from the Commission . CRAWFORD, supra
note 108, at 96 n.l18.
110. This proposition is, however, supported by those tribunals and
commentators that endorse the dualist distinction between the State as a regulator
and the State as a merchant.
111. See supra Part II.B.1
112. See Mayer, supra note 19, at 5.
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reduce the ability of host States to make credible commitments
and therefore lessen efficient cooperation between investors and
host States. It is also unnecessary with regard to the feared
flood of disputes under investment treaty arbitration. First, a
broad interpretation of umbrella clauses that allows bringing
any claim for the violation of an investor-State contract would
not allow investors to bring every commercial dispute or every
dispute about the violation of municipal law within the ambit of
investment treaty arbitration as some commentators and
tribunals fear."3 Instead, the limits imposed on investment
treaty arbitration by the scope of applicability of the relevant
investment treaty and the subject matter jurisdiction of the
ICSID Convention remain relevant. Both limit recourse to
arbitration under an investment treaty to investment-related
contracts."4 By contrast, contractual disputes arising out of
simple sales contracts, for instance, will not be upgraded by
means of an umbrella clause to a dispute that can be brought
under an investment treaty."5 Umbrella clauses do not affect
113. See El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 72 (Apr. 27, 2006); SGS Soci6t6
G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 166 (Aug. 6, 2003)
Cf. infra note 117.
114. See Gaffney & Loftis, supra note 4, at 13-15 (on the requirement of the
investment-related nature of the investor-State contract with respect to the host
State's promise vis-A-vis the foreign investor); Schreuer, supra note 4, at 253. On
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention as a jurisdictional limit to investment-related
disputes, see, for example, Burkhard Schbbener & Lars Markert, Das International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 105 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENCHAFr [ZVGLRWISS] 65, 81 et seq. (2006) (pointing
out that even if the definition of investment is broad enough to cover simple
contractual claims, for instance out of a simple sales contract, the definition of
investment in Art. 25 ICSID draws an outer limit to the definition of investment by
IIA or by the parties to an investment agreement even if they contractually
submitted a dispute by a choice of forum clause to the exclusive jurisdiction of
ICSID). See also Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/11, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 50 (July 30, 2004) ("The parties to a
dispute cannot by contract or treaty define as investment, for the purpose of ICSID
jurisdiction, something which does not satisfy the objective requirements of Article
25 ... and its reliance on the concept of investment, even if not specifically defined,
would be turned into a meaningless provision."); Carolyn Lamm, Jurisdiction of
ICSID, 6 ICSID REV.- FOREIGN INv. L. J. 462, 475 (1991).
115. See also the example given in Thomas W. Wdlde, International Investment
under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, J. WORLD TRADE L., Oct. 1995 at 48, of a
French village breaching a sales contract with a foreign petroleum company. Such
constellations would, however, be outside of the scope of the umbrella clause not
because the wording of the clause is overly broad and requires restrictive
interpretation, but because a simple sales contract is not covered by the notion of
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the classification of a contract as investment-related. They
merely allow breaches of investment-related contracts that
qualify as investment under the relevant investment treaty to
be brought under the treaty-based dispute settlement
procedure."6
Allowing claims for commercial breaches of investment-
related contracts to be brought before treaty-based tribunals as
a violation of an umbrella clause does not run counter to the
nature of investment arbitration either."7 Instead, the ICSID
Convention has not exclusively, nor even primarily, been
designed for disputes to be heard under investment treaties, but
rather intended to establish a forum for the settlement of
disputes concerning the interpretation and breach of contracts
between investor and States based on a contractual arbitration
clause." 8 In fact, the earliest disputes under the ICSID
Convention have all been contract-based disputes."'
Nor does the settlement of contractual investor-State
disputes under investment treaties threaten the sustainability
of the system of investment arbitration because of an
unmanageable increase in the number of disputes. Instead, the
structure of investment arbitration based on ad hoc arbitration
panels allows setting up third-party dispute resolvers in a
flexible manner whenever the need arises. Unlike a standing
court with a fixed number of judges, the institutional dispute
settlement structure is therefore able to adapt flexibly as the
demand for dispute resolution by the parties arises. Clogs of the
docket or judicial backlog are therefore not a concern that
should militate for a restrictive interpretation of umbrella
investment and is therefore outside of the scope of application of umbrella clauses
ratione materiae.
116. See infra Part V.A.
117. But see Wdlde, Contract Claims, supra note 4, at 226 ("If the pacta sunt
servanda clause applied to 'any contract' of foreigners with any governmental entity
or State enterprise, then there is a risk that BIT tribunals would indeed become
courts of first instance or an appeal authority for any of the innumerable contract
disputes likely to arise.").
118. See Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURs 331, 342-48
(1972-II) (on the historical backdrop of establishing the ICSID Convention, which
consisted in a lack of dispute settlement mechanisms); see also id. at 352-54
(pointing out that consent to arbitration under the ICSID Convention could be given
either in an investor-State contract, in an investment treaty, or in domestic
legislation).
119. See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, 89-
94 (2001).
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clauses. On the contrary, what seems fully sufficient to serve as
a filter for access to investment treaty arbitration is the cost
risk connected to potential claims. 2 ' Only when a dispute is
sufficiently economically valuable will an investor chose to
initiate arbitration and incur the cost risk. This should
effectively bar trivial disputes from investment treaty
arbitration.121
For the above mentioned reasons, distinctions between
sovereign and commercial breaches of investor-State contracts
and similar instruments should be discarded. Consequently,
umbrella clauses have to be viewed as a breakage with
traditional notions of State sovereignty and the insufficient
protection of investor-State contracts under customary
international law. Their function does not consist in merely
declaring a state of customary international law, but rather in
"introduc[ing] an exception to the general separation of States
obligations under municipal and international law."22 They
establish the jurisdiction under the dispute settlement
mechanism of investment treaties by allowing for a cause of
action under international law based on the breach of an
investor-State promise by the host State. If umbrella clauses
were merely declaratory of customary international law, by
clarifying that contractual rights are subject to expropriation,
the clauses would be wholly superfluous, as the prohibition of
direct and indirect expropriation would already protect
investors against host State conduct that interferes with the
investor's rights & titre de souverain. Accordingly, the primary
function of the umbrella clause is to provide for the enforcement
of such promises independent of the governing law by opening
recourse to an international forum for the settlement of disputes
120. See generally Stephan W. Schill, Arbitration Risk and Effective Compliance,
7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 653 (2006) (noting that one-way, pro-investor cost-shifting
schemes could lead to over-litigation, but shifting costs against investors who bring
spurious claims would be a sufficient barrier).
121. In this sense, see also Rudolf Dolzer, Schirmklauseln in
Investitionsschutzvertrh'gen, in VOLKERRECHT ALS WERTORDNUNG - FESTSCHRIFT
FOR CHRISTIAN ToMUSCHAT/COMMON VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW - ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, 281, 295 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2006);
Zolia, supra note 4, at 48. It is therefore not feasible to exclude certain categories as
insignificant breaches of host State promises, such as disputes over interest due to a
delay in performance. See Schreuer, supra note 4, at 253. To the extent the cost risk
merits initiating investor-State arbitration, the dispute is not insignificant from an
economic perspective.
122. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/11,
Award, para. 55 (Oct. 12, 2005).
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about the obligations arising under the host State's promise vis-
A-vis foreign investors. Umbrella clauses thus stabilize investor-
State relations ex post by offering enforcement mechanisms for
investment-related host State promises, independent of whether
the breach is of a sovereign or a commercial nature.
B. DISSOLUTIONS OF THE DUALIST FRAMEWORK IN
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
What the more restrictive line of interpretation of umbrella
clauses also disregards in its strict emphasis on the
national/international law divide is that even under customary
international law the distinction between contract claims and
treaty claims, respectively municipal law and international law,
was never as categorical as the restrictive approach purports.
By contrast, international law has always accepted that States
can submit claims for the violation of municipal law to
international law dispute resolution, including inter-State
proceedings. Similarly, modern investment treaties often allow
for the settlement of both treaty and contract claims based on
broadly worded arbitration clauses. Both of these developments
suggest that the distinction between claims for the violation of
domestic law and claims for the violation of international law
does not constitute a rigid distinction that would need to be
prolonged by a restrictive interpretation of umbrella clauses
that limits the clauses' scope of application to sovereign
breaches of investor-State contracts.
1. Contract Claims in Classical Inter-State Dispute Settlement
While customary international law only offers a limited
scope of protection to investor-State contracts, it has never
prevented States from submitting pure contract claims to inter-
State dispute resolution. Although States have traditionally
been reluctant to espouse claims by their nationals for simple
breaches of contract by means of diplomatic protection,'23
customary international law did not prohibit the espousal of
such claims. In fact, abundant State practice and older
123. The United States, for example, had a long-standing policy not to intervene
with force based on the breach of an investor-State contract. The reasons for this
were largely of a "political" nature. The fact that the investor had entered freely into
the agreement and voluntarily accepted the risk associated with contractual
breaches played a role. In addition, not upsetting inter-State relations was often
important. See Jennings, supra note 58, at 159, 164, 179-81.
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jurisprudence clearly confirms that States were not prevented
from solving disputes concerning the breach of contracts
between States and foreign nationals absent any independent
breach of international law in an international forum. These
cases further confirm that international law did not
categorically insist on the distinction between contract claims
and treaty claims, or even, excluded contract claims from the
ambit of international dispute settlement altogether.'
2 4
In Singer Sewing Machine, for example, the American-
Turkish Claims Commission upheld a claim by an American
company for the payment of the purchase price of sewing
machines sold to a Turkish Ministry with the following
considerations:
It cannot be said that the law of nations embraces any 'Law of
Contracts' such as is found in the domestic jurisprudence of nations.
International Law does not prescribe rules relative to the forms and
legal effect of contracts, but that law may be considered to be
concerned with the action authorities of a government may take with
respect to contractual rights. It is believed that in the ultimate
determination of responsibility under international law, application
can properly be given to principles of law with respect to confiscation,
and that the confiscation of the property of an alien is violative of
international law. If a government agrees to pay money for
commodities and fails to make payment, the view may be taken that
the purchase price of the commodities has been confiscated, or that the
commodities have been confiscated, or that property rights in a
contract have been destroyed or confiscated.'25
While the legal analysis in the Singer case remains in the
124. That these cases were mostly settled on the basis of an inter-State
compromis that established the jurisdiction of an international court of tribunal does
not vitiate, but rather confirms, that the general structure of international law was
not opposed to such a mingling of national and international law. But cf. Mann,
supra note 32, at 572 n.2 (stating that it is sufficient to bring a claim before an
international tribunal that arises under municipal law if the dispute is submitted by
way of compromis).
125. The United States of America on behalf of Singer Sewing Machine
Company v. The Republic of Turkey, in AMERICAN-TURKISH CLAIMS SETTLEMENT,
491 (Fred K. Nielsen preparer, 1937) (citing the Cook Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 Rep.
Int'l Arb. Awards 213 (1951)). The Cook Case involved the refusal of the Mexican
Government to pay the purchase price for 5,000 school benches delivered by an
American company under a contract governed by Mexican law awarded to the
company after a public bidding procedure. Although the contract was originally
awarded to the American company, the contract was, at the request of the Mexican
Government, concluded with a representative of the company in his own name. The
claim was ultimately dismissed by majority vote because Mexican law, as the law
governing the contractual relationship between the parties, did not give the
company a right to sue under the contract because it was not a party thereto.
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traditional dualist framework of international law by assuming
the necessity of an expropriatory conduct on behalf of the host
State,'26 the decision did not require the breach to be based on
sovereign conduct. Instead, the simple refusal to pay a
contractually due sum was a sufficient basis for finding in favor
of the foreign national based on the law of expropriation. This
decision, therefore, contrasts strikingly with the decisions in
SGS v. Philippines or Waste Management v. Mexico that both
considered simple non-performance of contractual obligations,
such as nonpayment, as insufficient for constituting
expropriation. '27
Similarly, the Landreau claim 2 ' concerned a dispute of a
quasi-contractual nature arising out of the refusal of the
Peruvian Government to pay royalties for the discovery of
Guano deposits to an American national. Although the award
was not based on breach of a contract, the Commission granted
relief on the basis of quantum meruit, a quasi-contractual
remedy. Again, it is interesting to note that an international
dispute settlement body entertained the case, although a
violation of international law separate from a breach of the
quasi-contractual relationship between the Peruvian
government and the American national was not in question.
Various cases were also entertained by the Mexican Claims
Commissions in the 1920s and 1930s that exclusively involved
claims for breaches of contracts governed by municipal law.'29
The Illinois Central Railroad case, 3 ' for example, concerned a
claim for the payment of money for the delivery of railroad
engines sold to the Mexican Government. The Respondent
moved to have the claim dismissed in arguing that there was no
question of the government's responsibility under international
law. The Commission, however, in interpreting the United
States-Mexican General Claims Convention that provided
jurisdiction for "all claims ... for losses or damages suffered by
persons or by their properties"'3 emphasized that:
126. Cf. The United States of America on behalf of Ina M. Hofmann and Dulce
H. Steinhardt v. The Republic of Turkey, in AMERICAN-TURKISH CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT, supra note 125, at 286.
127. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
128. Landreau (U.S. v. Peru) 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 352 (1922).
129. See A. H. FELLER, THE MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSIONS 173 et seq.
(Macmillan Co. 1935).
130. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. United Mexican States, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 134
(1926) (Illinois Central Railroad Case).
131. Convention of Sept. 8, 1923, United States-Mexican General Claims
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[c]laims as between a citizen of one country and the government of
another country acting in its civil capacity ... too are international in
their character, and they too must be decided 'in accordance with the
principles of international law', even in cases where international law
should merely declare the municipal law of one of the countries to be
applicable. 132
The Commission therefore expressly confirmed that
international law did not restrict States in submitting claims
that exclusively concerned breaches of contracts governed by
municipal law to inter-State dispute settlement, even if the host
State acted in its civil capacity and breached the contract by
means of purely commercial conduct.'33
Finally, the PCIJ entertained two cases that involved inter-
State disputes concerning claims for breaches of bond
agreements between private individuals and a foreign State that
were governed by French law. Both the Serbian Loans case and
the Brazilian Loans case involved questions of contract
interpretation and did not concern independent breaches of
inter-State obligations. At issue was instead whether bonds
drawn in "gold francs" were repayable on a gold basis or could
be effectuated in paper francs based on the nominal value of the
bonds, after France had abandoned the gold standard.
Having been submitted to the PCIJ on the basis of a Special
Agreement, the Court first addressed the question of
jurisdiction. It considered that the dispute needed to be of an
"international character" under the Court's Statute.3 4 Against
two dissenting opinions that argued that the international
character of a dispute actually required "show[ing] that the
subject matter of the dispute was governed by international law
and that the purpose of the decision was to enforce principles or
apply instruments of international law,"'35 the Court affirmed its
Commission, art. I, as reprinted in Feller, supra note 129, at 322-24.
132. Illinois Central Railroad Case, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 134 (1926).
133. Similarly, in The United States of America on Behalf of John A. McPherson
v. The United Mexican States, as reprinted in General Claims Comm'n (U.S. v.
Mex.), Opinions of the Commissioners, 325-29 (1927), the American-Mexican Claims
Commission ordered the government to pay the sums due under a postal money
order without raising the question of whether the non-payment of the amount due
did, apart from constituting a breach of contract, constitute a separate breach of
international law.
134. Serbian Loans, supra note 49, at 16; see also Payment in Gold of Brazilian
Federal Loans Contracted in France (Fr. v. Braz.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20/21,
Judgment no. 15, at 93-101 (July 12).
135. Serbian Loans, supra note 49, at 62 (Pess6a, dissenting); see also id. at 76
(Novacovitch, dissenting).
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jurisdiction, holding that when "two States have agreed to have
recourse to the Court, the latter's duty to exercise its
jurisdiction cannot be affected, in the absence of a clause in the
Statute on the subject, by the circumstance that the dispute
relates to a question of municipal law ....
Thus clarifying that even if a contractual relationship
between the national of one State and a foreign State was
exclusively governed by municipal law, international law
allowed the home State to exercise diplomatic protection, the
Court observed:
The controversy submitted to the Court in the present case ... solely
relates to the existence and extent of certain obligations which the
Serbian State is alleged to have assumed in respect of the holders of
certain loans. It therefore is exclusively concerned with relations
between the borrowing State and private persons, that is to say,
relations which are, in themselves, within the domain of municipal
law.
It is however to be noted that the question whether the manner in
which the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government is conducting the service of
its loans is in accordance with the obligations accepted by it, is no
longer merely the subject of a controversy between that Government
and its creditors. When the holders of the Serbian loans, considering
that their rights were being disregarded, appealed to the French
Government, the latter intervened on their behalf with the Serb-Croat-
Slovene Government.... As from this point, therefore, there exists
between the two Governments a difference of opinion which, though
fundamentally identical with the controversy already existing between
the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government and its creditors, is distinct
therefrom; for it is between the Governments of the Serb-Croat-
Slovene Kingdom and that of the French Republic, the latter acting in
the exercise of its rights to protect its nationals.
137
Although the dispute was "fundamentally identical with the
controversy already existing between the Serb-Croat-Slovene
Government and its creditors" 8 and "relate[d] exclusively to a
nexus of municipal law between the Serb-Croat-Slovene State as
borrower and the holders of certain States," '39 the PCIJ did not
consider international law to prevent States from litigating such
disputes in an inter-State forum. Likewise, the application of
domestic law was not an obstacle to the jurisdiction of an inter-
State dispute settlement mechanism.
In sum, neither the PCIJ nor other inter-State dispute
136. Id. at 19.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Id. at 18.
139. Id. at 20.
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settlement bodies found a rule of international law that
prevented States from bridging the difference between contract
claims and treaty claims by granting diplomatic protection and
submitting contract claims to international dispute settlement.
Much to the contrary, the case law confirms that international
law did not prevent States from espousing claims of their
nationals against the host State, even in a case where the
alleged breach only concerned a violation of national law. In
addition, the pertinent decisions do not reflect a presumption
against litigating breaches of municipal law in inter-State
proceedings as long as the jurisdictional basis can be reasonably
interpreted as covering claims for the breach of municipal law or
commercial breaches of investor-State contracts. This case law
and the underlying State practice therefore call into question
the restrictive approach to interpreting umbrella clauses that
elevates the contract claim/treaty claim distinction into a
doctrine of international law that could not be undone by
international treaties.
2. Broadly Worded Arbitration Clauses in Investment Treaties
That the national/international law divide is not as strict as
suggested by those who support a restrictive interpretation of
umbrella clauses can also be seen in broadly worded arbitration
clauses under many investment treaties that enable investors to
bring "any dispute relating to investments."'4 ° Arbitral tribunals
have interpreted such clauses as allowing foreign investors to
bring claims based on the violation of investor-State contracts
without alleging any separate violation of the investment treaty
in question, such as fair and equitable treatment or indirect
expropriation.
The Tribunals in Salini v. Morocco4' and Consortium RFCC
v. Morocco,'42 for example, had to consider the scope of Art. 8 of
139. For a discussion of broad arbitration clauses, see J6rn Griebel, Jurisdiction
over "Contract Claims" in Treaty-Based Investment Arbitration on the Basis of Wide
Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investment Agreements, 4 TRANSNAT'L DiSP. MGMT.
(Sept. 2007); Jbrn Griebel, Die Einbeziehung von "contract claims" in internationale
Investitionsstreitigkeiten uber Streitbeilegungsklauseln in
Investitionsschutzabkommen, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SCHIEDSVERFAHREN
[SCHIEDSVZ]/GERMAN ARB. J. 306 (2006). See also Gaffney & Loftis, supra note 4, at
13-15.
141. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 23, 2001).
142. Consortium RFCC v. Morocco, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/6,
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the Italian-Moroccan BIT that granted jurisdiction for "[a]ll
disputes and differences, including disputes related to the
amount of compensation due in the event of expropriation,
nationalisation, or similar measures, between a Contracting
Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party concerning
an investment of the said investor on the territory of the first
Contracting Party ....
Both Tribunals considered that this provision did not limit
the investor to bringing claims for the violation of international
law but "compels the State to respect the jurisdiction offer in
relation to violations of the Bilateral Treaty and any breach of a
contract that binds the State directly."' 44 Both tribunals thus
recognized that broadly worded arbitration clauses in BITs
could establish jurisdiction of treaty-based tribunals for simple
contract claims.
45
Like the older decisions in inter-State proceedings discussed
above,1 46 the inclusion of broadly worded arbitration clauses in
investment treaties shows that the distinction between contract
claims and treaty claims is not categorical and insurmountable.
On the contrary, as long as arbitration clauses in investment
treaties encompass both types of claims, contract claims can be
entertained by dispute resolution bodies established on the basis
of an international treaty. The practice of States to include
broadly worded arbitration clauses in investment treaties
therefore also confirms that international law is not built upon a
rigid distinction between contract claims and treaty claims that
Decision on Jurisdiction (July 16, 2001).
143. Salini v. Morocco, ICSID Case No.ARB/00/4, at para. 15.
144. Id. para. 61; see also Consortium RFCC, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, at para.
68.
145. In the concrete cases, the Tribunals declined jurisdiction because they
assumed that only contracts with the central government were covered, not
however, contracts with independent State agencies. See Salini v. Morocco, ICSID
Case No.ARB/00/4, at paras. 59-63; Consortium RFCC, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6,
at paras. 67-71; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 211 et seq.(Apr. 22, 2005). But
see Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 97 et seq. (Nov.
29, 2004); Compaffia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, para. 55
(July 3, 2002) (discussing claims against a province under Article 8 of the BIT). See
also SGS Soci~t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, paras. 131-
132 (Jan. 29, 2004) (accepting jurisdiction over contract claims based on broad
arbitration clauses).
146. See supra Part 0.
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would shield contract claims from treaty-based dispute
settlement.
In sum, there is sufficient State practice to support the
conclusion that, in principle, customary international law did
and does not prevent States from espousing the claim for breach
of contract by one of its nationals against the host State
independent of the existence of an independent breach of
international law. Consequently, there is no room for a
presumption of interpreting investment treaties, including
umbrella clauses, restrictively so as to uphold the allegedly
strict distinction between contract claims and treaty claims.
Such a presumption finds no basis in State practice or
international jurisprudence. Instead, the history of contract
claims in international dispute settlement fora as well as the
inclusion of broadly worded arbitration clauses in modern
investment treaties illustrate that the main problem in the
protection of investor-State contracts was more caused by the
lack of ready dispute settlement mechanisms for contract claims
than by any firm and dogmatic distinction between claims based
on international and those based on national law.'47
C. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON UMBRELLA CLAUSES
That the function of umbrella clauses is to establish
enforcement mechanisms for host State promises, independent
of whether a breach was of commercial or sovereign character, is
also supported by the historical background of the emergence of
umbrella clauses. 4 s Arguably the first umbrella clause was
included in an Agreement between the United Kingdom and
Peru from 1921 that created an ad hoc tribunal for the
resolution of a dispute over a mineral concession granted to a
British-owned company. The object of this agreement was not to
change the applicable law of the concession but to "elevate the
status of the resulting award from that of an award simply
147. Cf. Jennings, supra note 58, at 165 (arguing that the view denying any
genuine protection to State contracts by international law largely stems from a
misperception about the relationship between substantive and procedural law. It
thus "fall[s] into the error of erecting the absence of a remedy into a dogma, and
suppos[es] that where no remedy is, none could be. This easily ripens into the error
of continuing to suppose that no remedy can exist even where one is already
provided.").
148. For more information on this and the following, see Sinclair, supra note 2,
at 412-13, which provides an excellent study on the historical development of
umbrella clauses.
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between the investor and Peru, to an award in which Peru owed
to the United Kingdom an international obligation to comply
with its terms, and so to render its enforcement a matter of
international law."'49 The agreement therefore exclusively
served procedural purposes with respect to the effective
enforcement of an award rendered by the tribunal.
The aspect of providing enforcement for a contractual
agreement between a foreign investor and the host State was
again the main concern in the settlement negotiations between
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and the Iranian
Government in the early 1950s, after AIOC's oil operation in
Iran had been nationalized contrary to the Concession
Agreement between investor and host State. At issue was not so
much whether the breach of the Concession Agreement
amounted to a breach of international law. Rather, the problem
of contract stabilization primarily resulted from defects in the
dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms for breaches of
the Concession Agreement. On the investor-State level, the
arbitration clause in the concession was ineffective, because it
referred to an appointing authority that had ceased to exist. 5 '
On the inter-State level, a claim by the United Kingdom before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) failed because Iran had
only accepted the Court's jurisdiction relating to breaches of
treaties, not however with respect to customary law.'5' The
enforcement problem as regards the investor-State contract
therefore resulted not from a lack in substantive protection, but
rather from insufficiencies in third-party dispute settlement
mechanisms.
As a consequence, a primary concern in the settlement
negotiations between AIOC and Iran were the protection of the
to-be-concluded settlement arrangements against unilateral
breaches by the State. Lauterpacht, as AIOC's advisor,
therefore, suggested a double strategy: first, the inclusion of an
internationalization clause in the final settlement agreement
149. Id. at 414.
150. The Concession Agreement designated the President of the PCIJ as the
appointing authority. After the end of the PCIJ, the President of the ICJ refused to
regard himself as the successor of the President of the PCIJ and declined to serve as
the appointing authority under the Concession Agreement. See D. H. N. Johnson,
The Constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal, 30 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 152 (1953); Elihu
Lauterpacht, International Law and Private Foreign Investment, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 259, 271-72 (1997).
151. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July) (Preliminary
Objections).
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that would subject the contractual obligations between the host
State and the investor directly to international law, and second,
the conclusion of an international treaty between the United
Kingdom and Iran that would have mirrored the settlement
agreement between the investor and the State. The effect of this
construct was intended to be "that a breach of the contract or
settlement shall be ipso facto deemed to be a breach of the
treaty."'52 This arrangement would have offered a choice of
forum for the parties involved: AIOC could have either had
recourse to the arbitration mechanism under the investor-State
settlement agreement or had the United Kingdom government
pursue the claim as a breach of the umbrella treaty on an inter-
State level.'53 In case of an inter-State dispute, it seemed clear
that the ICJ would have had to decide whether a breach of the
settlement agreement had occurred and directly attach the
consequences of State responsibility to a breach of the contract.
Clearly, the primary purpose of Lauterpacht's construction
of the umbrella treaty was to provide contract stability by
providing an enforcement mechanism for the contractual
arrangements between the investor and the host State. The
purpose was "to add an inter-state remedy for breach of the
settlement agreement to a process of internationalization
already underway in the choice of the governing law and the
watertight arbitration clause contained in the Consortium
Agreement [i.e. the settlement agreement]."'54 By contrast, the
umbrella treaty as such would not have affected the governing
law of the contract. It would have merely supplemented the
contractual obligation with a parallel obligation between the
State parties involved, without however at this point providing
for a direct right of action of the investor in an international
dispute settlement forum.
Lauterpacht's suggestion of an independent treaty-based
protection of investor-State contracts soon made its way into
draft conventions for the protection of foreign investment. The
1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad
contained a provision according to which "[e]ach Party shall at
all times ensure the observance of any undertakings which it
may have given in relation to investments made by nationals of
152. Elihu Lauterpacht, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Ltd. Persian Settlement -
Opinion, Jan 20, 1954, p. 4 (as cited in Sinclair, supra note 2, at 415).
153. Sinclair, supra note 2, at 416.
154. Id.
[Vol. 18:1
UMBRELLA CLA USES
any other Party."'55 With its provisions on inter-State and
investor-State dispute settlement,'56 the primary effect of this
provision was to enable effective enforcement of investor-State
contracts. The provision was, however, not intended to change
the governing law of covered investor-State contracts, but
merely to stabilize them procedurally against ex post breaches.
The same holds true for other umbrella clauses that were
inspired by the Abs-Shawcross Draft and included in other draft
conventions and BITs in the late 1950s and 1960s.'57 The 1967
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property,
for example, provided in Art. 2 that "[e]ach Party shall at all
times ensure the observance of undertakings given by it in
relation to property of nationals of any other Party." '58 Like the
earlier Abs-Shawcross Draft, this provision aimed at providing
an international law remedy for the enforcement of host State
promises. By contrast, as explained in a committee report by the
American Bar Association,
[i]t would not turn private contracts into treaties; it would not create
obligations where none arose under the applicable law; it would not
impair sovereignty or the police power; but it would provide for giving
effect in an international forum to acquired rights arising from State
contracts, and in this way it would ensure the application of an
international standard where under international law that standard
should be applied.'
59
What the historic development of umbrellas clause suggests
is that the clauses focused primarily on providing procedural
remedies for breaches of host State promises, in particular
investor-State contracts, in order to make such bargains
enforceable. Historically, umbrella clauses were a reaction to
the insufficient protection of investor-State contracts and quasi-
155. Draft Convention on Investments Abroad art. 2, The Proposed Convention
to Protect Private Foreign Investment: A Round Table, 1 JOURNAL OF PUB. LAW 115-
18 (1960), reprinted in UNCTAD, 5 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A
COMPENDIUM, 395 (2000) [hereinafter Abs-Shawcross Draft]. The draft was a
combined and revised instrument of two earlier proposals made separately by Abs
and Shawcross; for more information on this and a discussion of the earlier separate
drafts, see Sinclair, supra note 2, at 418; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Abs.
Shawcross Draft Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment: Comments on the
Round Table, 10 J. PUB. L. 100 (1961).
156. Abs-Shawcross Draft, supra note 155, art. 7.
157. See Sinclair, supra note 2, at 427 (making reference, inter alia, to similar
clauses that were subsequently introduced into the investment treaties of Germany,
France, the United States, and the United Kingdom).
158. OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Publication
No. 23081, Nov. 1967, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 117, 123 (1968).
159. ABA, THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY INVESTED ABROAD, 96 (1963).
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contractual arrangements under national and international law
and aimed at remedying the lack of effective dispute resolution
mechanisms in investor-State contracting. They were designed
and intended to remedy the blind spots that the dualist
framework created by separating the contractual bond between
host State and investor from contract protection under
international law. As such, they were not intended as a purely
declaratory clarification of customary international law to the
effect that contractual rights could form the object of an
expropriation, but intended to stabilize investor-State
cooperation more comprehensively against any form of ex post
opportunistic behavior of the host State by allowing for effective
third-party dispute settlement.
The historic perspective, in other words, seamlessly fits in
with understanding umbrella clauses as breaking with the
dualist framework of international law and providing an
enforcement mechanism for host State promises, independent of
whether breaches were of a sovereign or a commercial nature.
The restrictive approach to the interpretation of umbrella
clauses therefore disregards not only the importance of
enforcement of host State promises for efficient investor-State
cooperation, but also the historic evidence that general
international law and the precursors of modern-day umbrella
clauses have never understood the national/international law
divide as a dogma that could not be surmounted by treaty
provisions that either submitted contract claims to international
dispute resolution or contained provisions that transformed the
observance of such promises into a treaty obligation under
international law.
IV. THE EFFECT OF UMBRELLA CLAUSES ON INVESTOR-
STATE RELATIONS
The previous section argued that the function of umbrella
clauses consists in providing a forum for settling disputes about
breaches of investment-related promises by host States vis-a-vis
foreign investors independent of whether such breaches arise
from sovereign or commercial conduct of the State. A different
issue is, however, the question of what effect, if any, umbrella
clauses have on the content of the relationship between investor
and host State. This concerns the influence of umbrella clauses
on the substantive obligations of the parties to an investor-State
contract and the relationship between investment treaty
[Vol. 18:1
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arbitration and forum selection clauses included in an
agreement between investor and State. Do umbrella clauses
only open an additional forum for the settlement of contractual
and quasi-contractual disputes between investors and host
States, or do they also affect the content of the substantive
obligations? Do they also stabilize the contractual relationship
between investor and host State and immunize it against every
change in the regulation of the contract? The latter is often
suggested when describing umbrella clauses as endorsing the
principle of pacta sunt servanda.
Yet, this section argues that umbrella clauses in investment
treaties do not incorporate the sanctity of contracts as a
principle that immunizes investor-State relations against any
future changes in the governing law or the regulatory
environment, or shield the contractual bond from all sorts of
commercial risks. Instead, this section argues that the general
function of umbrella clauses to protect investors against
opportunistic behavior of host States translates into a more
differentiated framework for the substantive function of
umbrella clauses. Even though disputes about any breach of an
investor-State contract can be submitted to investment treaty
arbitration based on an umbrella clause, the umbrella clause
does not have the effect of stabilizing the contractual bond
against every conceivable risk. Instead, it only upholds the
sanctity of contracts against opportunistic behavior of host
States, but does not provide solutions to problems arising from
gaps in investor-State contracts; nor does it exclude good faith
regulation of contracts based on the police power of the State or
the exercise of the State's prerogative of eminent domain in
regard of contractual rights. In this respect, umbrella clauses
are indeed merely codifications of customary international law.
Concerning the relation between treaty-based arbitration and
forum selection clauses, by contrast, this section supports the
primacy of the consent of the host State to arbitration under the
treaty.
A. UMBRELLA CLAUSES AND APPLICABLE LAW
The application of umbrella clauses gives rise to the
question whether the clauses change the applicable law
governing the relationship between the investor and the State
and accordingly constitute choice of law clauses. In fact, some
tribunals have based their unease concerning the application of
umbrella clauses on the idea that the clauses would transform
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contractual obligations governed by municipal law into treaty
obligations governed by international law. The Tribunal in SGS
v. Pakistan, for example, referred to the "transubstantiation of
contract claims into BIT claims,"'6 ° suggesting that the contract
was ipso lure transformed into an obligation under international
law.'6 ' This view is also echoed in the connection drawn by
various commentators between the umbrella clause and
internationalization clauses that subject a contract between a
State and a private individual to international law.'62
However, umbrella clauses differ fundamentally from choice
of law clauses and leave the applicable law that governs an
investor-State contract unaffected. This difference becomes clear
from the fact that umbrella clauses occasionally appear parallel
to choice of law clauses in international investment treaties.'63
While umbrella clauses constitute a substantive obligation
under an investment treaty, choice of law clauses determine the
applicable law in an investor-State dispute. Choice of law or
applicable law clauses would thus determine whether an
umbrella clause as part of an international treaty applies as
part of the governing law in a specific investor-State dispute. An
160. SGS Soci~t6 Gbnbrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para.
172 (Aug. 6, 2003).
161. The idea that the umbrella clause "transforms" investor-State contracts
into international obligations also lurks behind Prosper Weil's conceptualization of
umbrella clauses. See Weil, supra note 3, at 130.
L'intervention du trait6 de couverture transforme les obligations
contractuelles en obligations internationales et assure ainsi, comme on l'a
dit, 'l'intagibilit6 du contrat sous peine de violer le trait'; toute inex~cution
du contrat, serait-elle mbme rbgulibre au regard du droit interne de l'Etat
contractant, engage dbs lors la responsabilit6 internationale de ce dernier
envers l'Etat national du cocontractant.
Id. (footnote omitted). Cf. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 3, at 56
(suggesting that an umbrella clause "might possibly alter the legal regime and make
the agreements subject to the rules of international law").
162. See Wdlde, "Umbrella Clause" in Investment Arbitration, supra note 4, at
205 (pointing out that a "treaty's umbrella clause ... partly replaces the need to
negotiate in the contract with the host State an internationalization regime
consisting of stabilization, arbitration and an international-law clause"). See also
Weil, supra note 3, at 171 (observing that the umbrella clause leads to an
internationalization of investor-State contracts because "elle reflbte la volont6 des
Etats de hisser en quelque sorte ces contrats sur la scbne internationale").
163. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of
Argentina for the Protection and Promotion of Investments, U.K.-Arg., Dec. 11,
1990, entry into force Feb. 9, 1993 (containing an umbrella clause in Art. 2(2) and a
choice of law clause for investor-State disputes in Art. 8(4)).
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umbrella clause by itself cannot therefore determine its
application similar to a choice of law clause.
Assuming that umbrella clauses change the law governing
the investor-State relationship also confuses the inter-State
relationship, which contains the umbrella clause as part of an
international investment treaty, with the investor-State
relations. While the obligations in the BIT are obligations
entered into under international law, the relations between
investor and host State remain governed by whatever law the
parties to the investor-State contract have chosen as the
applicable law. Therefore umbrella clauses, as an inter-State
obligation, do nothing more than engage the host State's
international responsibility for breaches of its investment-
related promises. In contrast, the content of the obligation and
the question whether a breach has occurred is to be determined
according to the law applicable to this promise. Umbrella
clauses do nothing more than back up the contractual bargain
struck between the parties and enable the investor to enforce
the commitments accepted by the host State in the treaty-based
forum. They do not, however, affect the content of the
substantive obligations between investor and host State.
The interplay between contract law and treaty law is well
illustrated in the decision in SGS v. Philippines where the
Tribunal commented upon the relationship between the law
applicable to the contract and the umbrella clause. It stated that
an umbrella clause:
does not convert non-binding domestic blandishments into binding
international obligations. It does not convert questions of contract law
into questions of treaty law. In particular it does not change the proper
law of the CISS Agreement from the law of the Philippines to
international law. Article X(2) addresses not the scope of the
commitments entered into with regard to specific investments but the
performance of these obligations, once they are ascertained.
1
6
Similarly, the Annulment Committee in CMS v. Argentina
states that "[t]he effect of the umbrella clause is not to
transform the obligation which is relied on into something else;
the content of the obligation is unaffected, as is its proper
law."'65 Even though umbrella clauses break with the dualist
164. Soci6t6 G~n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 126 (Jan.
29, 2004) (internal citation omitted).
165. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Annulment, para. 95(c) (Sept. 25, 2007).
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conception of international law when it comes to the clauses'
enforcement function, it is thus crucial to distinguish clearly
between the law governing the substance of the relations on the
inter-State and the investor-State level.'66
In the terminology of conflicts of laws, the questions of
whether a commitment of the host State exists and whether this
commitment has been breached are preliminary questions that
have to be answered positively before examining whether an
umbrella clause under an investment treaty has been breached.
The content of the host State's commitments vis-A-vis a foreign
investor and the question of whether such commitments have
been breached have to be determined according to the law
governing the investor-State relations. This encompasses
questions of contract formation, contract validity, contract
interpretation, and the influence of factual developments taking
place after the conclusion of the contract, such as impossibility
of performance, frustration of purpose, etc. All these questions
are governed by the law applicable to the investor-State
relations. For example, if an investor-State contract is governed
by Philippine law, it is Philippine law that determines how gaps
in a contract are to be filled and which legal instruments are
applicable in this regard. It is, by contrast, not a question that is
answered by the umbrella clause under the investment treaty,
which only governs the inter-State relations. Thus, umbrella
clauses only engage the host State's international responsibility
once a breach of the law governing the investor-State relations
has occurred. The competence to determine whether this is the
case rests with the treaty-based forum seized.167
166. See Mayer, supra note 19, at 37 ("Cette position [i.e., that of Prosper Weil]
m6connait qu'il existe deux rapports distincts et parall~les: le rapport inter partes,
entre parties au contrat d'Etat, qui reste soumis A la lex contractus, et le rapport
inter6tatique, qui relive du droit des gens. Que la violation par l'Etat de ses
obligations n6es du contrat constitue en m6me temps la violation du trait6 ne suffit
pas A alt6rer la nature de l'un ou de l'autre.").
167. The application and construction of domestic law has played a role in a
number of international cases. See, e.g., Questions relating to Settlers of German
Origin in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6, at 29 (Sep. 10);
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A No. 7,
at 19 (May 25) ("From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is
its organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the
activities of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative
measures."); Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1925 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 2, at 29-33 (Mar. 26) (concerning the question of validity of a concession
governed by national law); Serbian Loans, supra note 49, at 15-19 (discussing
interpretation of bonds governed by national law).
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B. UMBRELLA CLAUSES AND FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
Another question concerning the interplay between
international law and the law governing the relations between
the State and the foreign investor concerns the contentious
question of whether an investor can initiate investment treaty
arbitration based on the violation of an umbrella clause despite
the existence of the forum selection clause in the investor-State
contract in favor of the courts of the host State or arbitration.
Prima facie, two solutions seem possible. The contractual forum
selection could exclude investment treaty arbitration based on
the argument that this is the forum the parties to the contract
envisaged as the competent forum to decide on claims for the
breach of contract. As long as host State and investor abide by
this choice, one could argue, no violation of the contractual
framework that was chosen as the governing framework for the
investor-State relations has occurred. Alternatively, one could
accord primacy to the treaty-based forum to resolve contractual
disputes between the investor and the host State as violations of
the umbrella clause and emphasize the separability between the
substantive obligations that govern the content of investor-State
relations and the forum selection as an agreement relating to
enforcement and dispute settlement.
In arbitral practice, however, the conflict between
contractual forum selection and treaty-based arbitration in the
context of umbrella clauses has received different solutions.
Some tribunals and commentators argue that the jurisdiction of
treaty-based tribunals trumps any contrary forum selection for
claims for the violation of the treaty. The opposing approach
considers that forum selection clauses should take precedence
over treaty-based dispute settlement concerning the violation of
an umbrella clause. The Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan, for
example, considered that a broad understanding of umbrella
clauses would enable an investor to "render any mutually
agreed procedure of dispute settlement, other than BIT-specified
ICSID arbitration, a dead-letter, at the investor's choice. The
investor would remain free to go to arbitration either under the
contract or under the BIT."'68 Similarly, the majority in SGS v.
Philippines accorded primacy to the forum selection clause in
the case at hand in alluding to "[t]he basic principle ... that a
168. SGS Socit6 G~n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para.
168 (Aug. 6, 2003); see also Eureko, supra note 6, para. 11 (Rajski, dissenting).
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binding exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract should be
respected, unless overridden by another valid provision."'69 It
considered that "the BIT did not purport to override the
exclusive jurisdiction clause in the [investor-State contract], or
to give SGS an alternative route for the resolution of contractual
claims which it was bound to submit to the Philippine courts
under that Agreement.""'7 As a consequence, the Tribunal in
SGS v. Philippines decided to stay the treaty-based proceedings
in view of the proceedings that were already pending in
Philippine courts. It thus gave effect to the premise that a
breach of the umbrella clause would require that a breach of the
underlying investor-State contract was not remedied in
accordance with the dispute settlement mechanism the parties
chose.
The majority of tribunals, by contrast, take the opposite
approach and view, like the dissenting opinion in SGS v.
Philippines, the host State's consent to arbitration under the
BIT as a forum that can be seized alternatively to any
contractually selected forum.7  In Eureko v. Poland, for
example, the Tribunal accepted its jurisdiction based on an
umbrella clause for a dispute about the breach of an investor-
State agreement relating to the privatization of a State-owned
insurance company, although the agreement contained a forum
selection clause in favor of Polish courts. The Tribunal reasoned
that since the violation of an umbrella clause constituted a
treaty-based cause of action, the contractual forum selection
could not exclude treaty-based arbitration.'72 In its support, the
Tribunal relied on the settled arbitral jurisprudence that
contractual forum selection clauses could not derogate from the
jurisdiction of treaty-based tribunals for claims based on the
breach of treaty.'73 Unlike in SGS v. Philippines, the contractual
169. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, at para. 138. See generally
id. paras. 136-55.
170. Id. para. 143; see also id. para. 141 (explaining that a "framework treaty,
intended by the States Parties to support and supplement, not to override or replace,
the actually negotiated investment arrangements made between the investor and
the host State").
171. Id. paras. 4-5 (Crivellaro, dissenting).
172. Eureko, supra note 6, paras. 92-114, 250.
173. See Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras.
264-73 (Nov. 14, 2005); Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 286-90 (Apr. 22, 2005);
SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, at para. 161; Compafiia de Aguas del
Aconquija, S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
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forum in the case at hand had not been seized prior to
investment arbitration. Furthermore, in Noble Ventures v.
Romania, the Tribunal accepted, despite the existence of a
forum selection clause, jurisdiction over the alleged breach of
the terms of a privatization agreement for a State-owned steel
mill that was concluded between the foreign investor and a
State instrumentality.74 In addition, a number of further
decisions discarded the objection to the tribunals' jurisdiction
based on the primacy of a forum selection clause between the
foreign investor and the host State in cases where a violation of
an umbrella clause was invoked.'75 These tribunals therefore
assumed that treaty-based arbitration took primacy over a
forum selection clause in case the violation of an umbrella
clause was alleged.
Several arguments, however, support the view that a
contractual forum selection clause cannot override the consent
to arbitration under a BIT when the investor invokes a violation
of the umbrella clause and therefore brings a claim based on the
international responsibility of the host State for the breach of its
promise. First, a violation of an umbrella clause has to be
qualified as a violation of an inter-State obligation.
Consequently, its cause of action is based on an international
treaty, not on the breach of an investor-State contract. It
constitutes a treaty claim, not a contract claim. Accordingly, the
firmly established jurisprudence that contractual forum
No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, paras. 75 (July 3, 2002); Compafiia de Aguas
del Aconquija, S.A. & Compagnie G6n6rale des Eau v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, paras. 53-55 (Nov. 21, 2000); Lanco Int'l Inc.
v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/6, Decision on Jurisdiction paras.
21-28 (Dec. 8, 1998). The dissenting opinion in Eureko v. Poland, by contrast, took
the contrary position and criticized the majority's solution, noting that "by opening a
wide door to foreign parties to commercial contracts concluded with a State-owned
company to switch their contractual disputes from normal jurisdiction of
international commercial arbitration tribunals or state courts to BIT Tribunals."
Eureko, supra note 6, para. 11 (Rajski, dissenting).
174. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/11,
Award, para. 2 (Oct. 12, 2005).
175. See Camuzzi Int'l S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 105-19. (June 10, 2005); AES Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction,
paras. 90-99 (May 26, 2005); Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 89-
94 (Jan. 14, 2004); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/01/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 75-81 (Dec. 8, 2003); CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8,
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, paras. 70-76 (July 17, 2003).
2009]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LA w
selection clauses cannot override the consent to investor-State
arbitration relating to the violations of an investment treaty
also has to apply to a claim involving the violation of an
umbrella clause. The same rationale applies to violations of
umbrella clauses as to breaches of other provisions of
investment treaties, namely that the subject matters and the
causes of action of contract claims and treaty claims differ.'76
While the contract claim concerns the liability of the host State
vis-A-vis the foreign investors under the law applicable to the
investor-State contract, the treaty claim under the umbrella
clause relates to the international responsibility of the host
State for the violation of an obligation vis-A-vis the investor's
home State. That the parties to the investment dispute are the
same as the parties to a contractual claim under the selected
forum is, however, irrelevant as investment treaty arbitration
"is not only a specific dispute settlement mechanism between
foreign investors and host States, but also a compliance
mechanism for the inter-State obligations contained in the
substantive provisions of the international investment treaty."'77
In this view, the investor does not only bring a claim in its own
name for enforcing its right under an investor-State contract,
but also enforces the umbrella clause obligation under the
investment treaty in place between the host State and the
investor's home State.'78
That a contractual forum selection clause cannot bind a
treaty-based tribunal sitting on the question of a violation of the
umbrella clause as an obligation under international law also
becomes clear, if one envisages the case that the investor's home
State decides to initiate inter-State arbitration under a BIT and
invokes the violation of the treaty's umbrella clause. In this
176. Bernardo Cremades & David J. A. Cairns, Contract and Treaty Claims and
Choice of Forum in Foreign Investment Disputes, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 89, at 325, 327-32 (explaining that contract
rights and treaty rights differ concerning the source of the right, the content of the
right, the parties to the claim, the applicable law, and the liability of the host State
once as a matter of domestic law, once based on its international responsibility).
177. Schill, supra note 120, at 681.
178. See id., at 681-83; see also Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v.
United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, para. 233 (June
26, 2003) ("claimants are permitted for convenience to enforce what are in origin the
rights of Party states"). Cf. SGS Soci6td G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of
the Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction, para. 154 (Jan. 29, 2004) ("Although under modern international law,
treaties may confer rights, substantive and procedural, on individuals, they will
normally do so in order to achieve some public interest.") (internal citation omitted).
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case, the State would clearly not be bound by the contractual
forum selection in the investor-State relation, because the
investor does not dispose of the power to restrict its home State
concerning the arbitration mechanism under an international
treaty. In addition, the dispute settlement mechanism under a
BIT cannot be overridden or dispensed with under a forum
selection clause, because this would effectively contain a
prospective waiver of the right offered to a foreign investor in an
international treaty to have recourse to a treaty-based
tribunal. 7 9 If one perceives investment treaty arbitration as
private enforcement of public international law, there is no
reason why the investor should be treated less favorably than
its home State in terms of access to arbitration under the treaty-
based forum.
Furthermore, the view that the investor-State obligation
under the umbrella clause has only been breached after the
contractual forum has been seized can be countered by the
concept of the severability of the contract's arbitration clause
and the substantive obligations stipulated in the treaty. The
concept of severability views contractual arbitration clauses as
an agreement between the parties that is independent from the
substantive obligations. This concept is not only uniformly
accepted in commercial arbitration, 8 ' but also in various cases
under international law. 8' Similarly, Art. 25 of the ICSID
Convention supports the independence of the consent to
arbitration from the underlying substantive obligations between
178. On the question of whether an investor can waive the rights granted under
an international investment treaty, see Sch6bener & Markert, supra note 114, at 96
et seq. (declining this possibility because the investor does not have the power to
dispose over rights and obligations under international law and would thus violate
interests his home State may have in enforcing the substantive obligations under
the BIT). See also Wilde, "Umbrella Clause" in Investment Arbitrations, supra note
4, at 211, 232 (with further references). But see Ole Spiermann, Individual Rights,
State Interests and the Power to Waive ICSID Jurisdiction, 20 ARB. INT'L 179, 210
(2004).
180. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 55-74 (2d ed. 2001) (with further references).
181. See Plama Consortium Ltd. v Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24,
Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 212 (Feb. 8, 2005); Stran Greek Refineries and
Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, Judgment of Dec. 9, 1994, Ser. A - 301-B, 65, para. 72;
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v.
Government of the Arab Republic of Libya, 1975, 53 I.L.R. 389, 393 (R.J. Dupuy,
Sole Arb. 1979) (Preliminary Decision of Nov. 27); The Losinger & Co. Case, Decision
of Oct. 11, 1935, P.C.I.J. Reports (Ser. C) No. 78, p. 110; Lena Goldfields Company
Ltd v. Soviet Government, 5. Ann. Dig. & Rep. Pub. Int'l L. Cases (1929-1930) (case
no. 258).
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the parties.'82 Accordingly, the violation of the substantive rights
and obligations contained in an investor-State contract can be
severed from the contractual forum selection clause.
Finally, reasons of efficiency and expediency militate for the
overriding effect of BIT arbitration. Uniting all claims for the
violation of a BIT, including those contractual breaches brought
under an umbrella clause, supports the effective dispute
settlement in a single forum and promotes the efficient solution
of disputes."8 3 These concerns are not outweighed by the
argument, often invoked in favor of requiring parties to first
seize the contractually chosen forum, that the chosen forum, in
particular domestic courts, would be better placed to decide
disputes relating to the interpretation and application of the
substantive law that governs the investor-State relations. The
argument purports that domestic courts, or any other
contractually chosen forum, would be better placed to decide
contractual questions in the context of an umbrella clause
violation, because domestic judges have superior knowledge of
the governing law compared to arbitrators sitting at the
international level. Although this argument has some intuitive
appeal, it does not take into account that often investor-State
contracts do not primarily turn on intricate questions
concerning the interpretation and application of domestic law,
but are primarily difficult with respect to often comprehensive
factual issues. But even if it were true that intricate questions of
domestic law are decisive for a certain dispute, host State and
investor would be free to appoint arbitrators for resolving their
dispute in a unitary treaty-based forum that bring the requisite
expertise to the table. Apart from that, one of the reasons why
international arbitration has developed as a mechanism to
stabilize investor-State cooperation and enforce promises the
host State has given is precisely the insufficiencies that exist in
domestic dispute settlement. 84  Referring parties to a
contractually chosen forum may thus frustrate the very basis
and justification of investment treaty arbitration and the
182. See Weil, supra note 3, at 223.
183. Cf. Christoph Schreuer, Calvo's Grandchildren: The Return of Local
Remedies in Investment Arbitration, 4 The Law & Practice of Int'l Courts and
Tribunals 1, 12 (2005) ("If competing competences exist, it makes more sense to have
the entire dispute heard by one forum, preferably the one with the most
comprehensive jurisdiction. If the terms of reference in the BIT are broad enough to
include contract claims in addition to treaty claims the international tribunal would
be the one with the broadest jurisdiction.").
184. See supra Part II.B.1.
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creation of umbrella clauses as a mechanism that remedies
insufficiencies in the enforcement of contractual promises of the
host State vis-A-vis foreign investors.
Certainly, understanding the jurisdictional function of
umbrella clauses in such a broad fashion creates certain
problems of competing jurisdiction and enables forum shopping
by foreign investors who could potentially seize the contractual
forum in a first step and subsequently invoke the violation of
the umbrella clause in an investment treaty in case the first
proceedings did not yield the desired result. However, in order
to deny the investor a second bite at the apple, such situations
can arguably be dealt with efficiently by concepts such as abus
de droit, res judicata, or estoppel.'85 Likewise, judicial comity or
a broad understanding of lis pendens might constitute ways to
avoid parallel and/or subsequent proceedings. 86 On this basis,
one can also justify the decision of the majority in SGS v.
Philippines to stay the BIT proceedings in order to have the
Philippine Court decide the dispute already submitted by the
investor in accordance with the contractual forum selection and
square it with the contrary approach in Eureko v. Poland, where
the investor had not initiated proceedings in conformity with
the forum selection clause.
As a matter of principle, however, the decisions to stay
investment treaty arbitration in order to allow the forum chosen
by the parties to decide questions of contract interpretation and
breach, seems unconvincing not only in terms of the
multiplication of proceedings and the efficiency and expediency
of dispute resolution. It also is incompatible with the
classification of claims for the violation of umbrella clauses as
treaty claims. Accordingly, claims for the violation of umbrella
clauses should not be treated differently from claims for the
violation of other investment treaty provisions, such as fair and
equitable treatment or the concept of indirect expropriation.
185. See Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts
between ICSID Decisions on Multisourced Investment Cases, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 835,
849-51 (2005). Concepts of lis pendens of res judicata, by contrast, will not be
operative, because of the different nature of the contract claim and the claim for the
violation of the umbrella clause, even though the content of the host State's
obligation is identical. SGS Socibt6 G~nbrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic
of Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction, para. 182 (Aug. 6, 2003). For the arguments of the parties on this point,
see id. paras. 46, 52, 60-61, 111-17. Cf. Christer S6derlund, Lis Pendens, Res
Judicata and the Issue of Parallel Judicial Proceedings, 22 J. INT'L ARB. 301 (2005).
186. Shany, supra note 185, at 849-50.
2009]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
With respect to those treaty claims, the Tribunals in Impregilo
v. Pakistan'87 and Bayindir v. Pakistan8 ' declined to stay ICSID
arbitration in view of national court proceedings on the
argument that the cause of action under the BIT was different
from the cause of action for breach of treaty. Even though
neither case alleged the breach of an umbrella clause, the
observation of the Tribunal in Bayindir v. Pakistan, should be
applied to any treaty claim including claims for the violation of
an umbrella clause:
When the investor has a right under both the contract and the treaty,
it has a self-standing right to pursue the remedy accorded by the
treaty. The very fact that the amount claimed under the treaty is the
same as the amount that could be claimed (or was claimed) under the
contract does not affect such self-standing right.
8 9
C. OPPORTUNISTIC HOST STATE BEHAVIOR VERSUS
CONTINGENCIES
If investor-State contracts were in fact complete contracts,
i.e. contracts that govern the mutual rights and obligations
without lacunae, umbrella clauses would allow investors to
enforce their contractual rights tels quels. Yet contracts,
especially complex contracts in long-term relationships, are
never complete.19 ° They contain gaps and do not cover every
possible aspect of the parties' relation, because the future state
of the world is not fully predictable and the costs for negotiating
and drafting complete contracts are prohibitively high. As a
consequence, not all aspects that are or might become relevant
for the parties' relationship can be included from an ex ante
perspective at the time of contract formation. Regularly, the
stability of the parties' contractual bond, therefore, needs to be
complemented by ex post dispute settlement and enforcement
mechanisms in order to effectively counter incentives for either
party to behave opportunistically.
Yet, the stability of long-term contracts does not only have
187. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 286-90 (Apr. 22, 2005).
188. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras.
264-73 (Nov. 14, 2005).
189. Id. at para. 167.
190. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of
Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 691-92 (1986); see also Pierpaolo
Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing
Contracts, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 798 (2002)
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to grapple with the contracting parties' opportunistic behavior
to benefit from subsequent defects from contractual obligations.
Long-term contracts are also confronted with the occurrence of
unforeseen contingencies. 9' Contingencies are fundamentally
different from opportunistic behavior. While the latter consists
in rent-seeking behavior contrary to the risk allocation of the
contract, the former is plainly outside the scope of the
obligations assumed by the parties. The occurrence of
contingencies is therefore an exogenous factor that, although it
may offset the contractual bargain, does not result from
opportunistic actions of one of the parties. Even though contract
drafting techniques exist that aim at addressing the effect of
future contingencies, such as renegotiation clauses,'92 the
occurrence of contingencies can never be excluded completely
due to the expenses connected to drafting a complete contract.193
While umbrella clauses clearly target opportunistic
behavior of host States, they do not, it is submitted, prevent the
intervention of the host State in adapting an investor-State
contract in light of contingencies, or its refusal to perform based
on contingencies. Such conduct does therefore not constitute a
violation of an umbrella clause. Even though umbrella clauses
are worded without hinting at the possibility of recognizing
exceptions to the sanctity of contracts in case of contingencies,
such an exception has to be implied. This can be based on a
number of arguments. Apart from the fundamental difference
between opportunistic rent-seeking behavior and contingencies
that are outside the risk allocation of the contract in question,
the acceptance of contingencies as excusing contractual
performance has been accepted with respect to the predecessors
of present-day umbrella clauses and is accepted as a general
principle of law in a number of domestic legal system and
general international law.
With respect to the umbrella clauses in the Abs-Shawcross
Draft and the OECD Draft Convention, commentators opined
that these provisions implicitly accepted exceptions to the
191. On the difference between opportunism and contingencies, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93 et seq. (6th ed. 2003).
191. Stefan Kr6ll, The Renegotiation and Adaptation of Investment Contracts, in
ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 89, at 425; Klaus Peter
Berger, Aquivalenzst6rungen, Neuverhandlungsklauseln und Vertragsanpassung bei
internationalen Konzessionsvertrdigen sowie Probleme der Streitschlichtung, in
RECHTSPROBLEME VON AUSLANDSINVESTITIONEN 65 (Jiirgen F. Baur & Stephan
Hobe eds., 2003).
193. See sources cited supra note 190.
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sanctity of contracts. Shawcross himself acknowledged that Art.
II of the Abs-Shawcross Draft did not intend to exclude the
concept of the clausula rebus sic stantibus as part of customary
international law, even though this did not appear in the
clause's wording.'94 Similarly, the discussion about the effect of
Art. 2 of the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of
Foreign Property suggests that this provision was subject to
implicit exceptions for contingencies. A Committee Report of the
American Bar Association, for example, concluded that the
umbrella clause in the OECD Draft Convention "would not
impair sovereignty or the police power; but it would provide for
giving effect in an international forum to acquired rights arising
from State contracts, and in this way it would ensure the
application of an international standard."'95 Similarly, Seidl-
Hohenveldern considered that the OECD Draft Convention,
including its umbrella clause, "like any other treaty-would be
subject to the clausula rebus sic stantibus"'96 and consequently
allow for "a degree of flexibility."'97 In his view, the clause would
thus not operate as a permanent freeze of the contractual
arrangements in investor-State relations. This underscores that
the limitation of the umbrella clause in targeting opportunistic
behavior of host States was already well understood as an
underlying concept of its interpretation and application in the
1960s.
The difference between preventing opportunistic behavior
and the need to react flexibly to an unexpected change of
circumstances can also be traced as a fundamental difference in
virtually any domestic legal system. It is addressed by various
concepts, including the doctrines of clausula rebus sic stantibus,
force majeure, impossibility, frustration,'98 imprgvision,'99 or the
194. Hartley W. Shawcross, The Problems of Foreign Investment in International
Law, 102 RECUEIL DES COURS 335, 353-55 (1961-I).
195. See ABA, supra note 159159, at 95 et seq.
196. Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 155, at 106.
197. Id.
198. See Stefan Schmiedlin, FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT UND CLAUSULA REBUS
SIC STANTIBUS, at 21-88 (Schriftenreihe des Instituts filr Internationales Recht und
Internationale Beziehungen [Series of publications of the Institute for International
Law & International Relations] No. 38, 1985). See U.C.C. § 2-615 (2003) for the
American codification of the concept of commercial impracticality; and on this, see
generally Thomas R. Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy: Judicial
Reallocation of Contractual Risks Under UCC Section 2-615, 54 N.C. L. REV. 545
(1975).
199. See Compagnie Gkn6rale d'Eclairage de Bordeaux, CE, Mar. 30, 1916 in
LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE 129-30 (M. Long, et al.
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Lehre von der Geschdftsgrundlage,°° and accepted in numerous
domestic legal systems."1 Furthermore, various projects of
codification of principles of contract law 2 and international
private law,"' as well s numerous international arbitration
awards, draw a distinction between opportunistic behavior and
contingencies and accept that under certain circumstances
unforeseen contingencies allow a departure from contractual
obligations.0 4 The distinction also features in the doctrine of
change of circumstances under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. 5 Likewise, under customary international law,
eds., 8th ed. 2003); Compagnie des tramways de Cherbourg, CE Ass., Dec. 9, 1932 D.
1943 in C. CIV. art. 1134, para. 14 (Dalloz 101st ed. 2002).
199. See, e.g., Giinter H. Roth, in Miinchener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen
Gesetzbuch, vol. II, Art. 242 para. 594 (4th ed. 2001). The doctrine has been
established as a special application of the principle of good faith and has been
recently codified in Bdirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [German Civil Code]
PROMULGATION GAZETTE, § 313. The Lehre von der Geschdftsgrundlage also
applies to public law contracts and is codified at Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz
[VwVfG] [German Administrative Law Code] § 60. The elements and consequences
are essentially the same as under the general civil law. See Dieter Lorenz, Der
Wegfall der Geschdftsgrundlage beim verwaltungsrechtlichen Vertrag, 112
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT [DVBl.] 865 (1997).
201. See Schmiedlin, supra note 198, at 89-178 (concerning Swiss Law); PHONG-
JIE Su, DIE KLAUSEL DER VERANDERTEN UMSTANDE IM CHINESISCHEN RECHT: ZUR
REZEPTION DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS IN CHINA (1981) (on Chinese law); see also
Codice civilie [C.C.] [Civil Code] art. 1467 (Italy); Astikos Kodikas [A.K.] [Civil Code]
art. 388 (Greece); Burgerlijk Wetboek [B] [Civil Code] art. 258 (Neth.); C6digo
Civil [Civil Code] art. 437 (Port.); Grazhdanskii Kodeks [GK] [Civil Code] art. 451
(Russ.).
202. See Principles of European Contract Law, Commission on European
Contract Law, 2000, art. 6:111; UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, 2004, art.
5.2.2.
203. On the question of whether Art. 79 of the Convention on the International
Sale of Goods allows taking account of a change of circumstances, see Dionysios P.
Flambouras, The Doctrines of Impossibility of Performance and Clausula Rebus Sic
Stantibus in the 1980 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
and the Principles of European Contract Law - A Comparative Analysis, 13 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 261, 277-81 (2001). Cf. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 7,
Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG, paras. 26-40 (Oct.
12, 2007), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op7.html#1.
203. Manufacturing Plant (Neth. v. Turk.), ICC Award No. 8486, 24a Yb. Comm.
Arb. 162, 167 (1999); Steel Bars (Egypt v. Yugo.), ICC Award No. 6281 15 Yb.
Comm. Arb. 96, 98 (1990); Bank Guarantees (Ind. v. Pak.), ICC Award No. 1512, 1
Yb. Comm. Arb. 128, 129 (1976). See also Hans van Houtte, Changed Circumstances
and Pacta Sunt Servanda, in TRANSNATIONAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 105, 107 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 1993); RAINER
VELTEN, DIE ANWENDUNG DES VOLKERRECHTS AUF STATE CONTRACTS IN DER
INTERNATIONALEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 116 et seq. (1987).
204. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for
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the doctrine of change of circumstances has been read into
contracts between States and foreign nationals.206  This
widespread acceptance of the doctrine in domestic and
international law therefore suggests that it constitutes a
general principle of law."7
What is common to all these doctrines is that they
constitute ways of dealing with contingencies that arise in long-
term relational contracts. The elements common to all
expressions of the clausula in its various shades that justify an
adaptation of the contractual relationship are:
1.the change of circumstances that were either explicitly
stipulated or presupposed by the parties after the
conclusion of the contract;
2.the risk of the change of circumstances is outside the
sphere of risk of both parties according to the risk
allocation of the contract;
3.the change of circumstances was not foreseeable; and
4.the change affected the contractual equilibrium
significantly so that one has to assume that the
parties would not have concluded the contract the
way it has been concluded.
In sum, it is widely accepted both in domestic as well as in
international law that the principle of pacta sunt servanda is
not strictly adhered to but limited with respect to influence of
future contingencies on the contractual bond. This widespread
acceptance should thus also be mirrored in the interpretation
and application of the umbrella clause in backing up private
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, accepts the doctrine of change of
circumstances for international treaties; see IAN BROWNLIE PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990) 619-21; Detlev F. Vagts, Rebus Revisited:
Changed Circumstances in Treaty Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (2005).
205. See ULRICH AMMANN, DER SCHUTZ AUSLANDISCHER PRIVATINVESTITIONEN
IN ENTWICKLUNGSLANDERN AUS VOLKERRECHTLICHER, VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTLICHER
UND BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTLICHER SICHT 110-13. (1967); HELMUT FRICK,
BILATERALER INVESTITIONSSCHUTZ IN ENTWICKLUNGSLANDERN 52 (1975). See also
LIAMvCO v. Libya, 20 I.L.M. 1, 57 (1981) ('IT]he binding force is subject to the
continuance of circumstances under which a treaty was concluded. If such
circumstances change substantially, then its modification or cancellation may be
claimed or resorted to.').
206. RALF KOBLER, DIE "CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS" ALS ALLGEMEINER
RECHTSGRUNDSATZ (1991); BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 113, 118-19
(1953) (stressing that a change in circumstances must have been not reasonably
contemplated at the time of the conclusion of an international treaty); Norbert Horn,
Changes in Circumstances and the Revision of Contracts in Some European Laws
and in International Law, in ADAPTATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 15, 25 (Norbert Horn ed., 1985).
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ordering between investors and host States. While opportunistic
breaches of investor-State contracts clearly constitute a breach
of the umbrella clauses, reactions to contingencies do not engage
the international responsibility of the host State. However, in
case the host State invokes a change of circumstances in order
to change the terms of an investor-State contract or to deny
performance of its obligations, specific attention has to be paid
to the question of whether a specific circumstance is within or
outside the allocation of risk provided for in the original
bargain. The danger, of course, exists that the host State will
use changes in circumstances as a pretext in order to extract
additional benefits from the initial bargain and, thus act
opportunistically. Consequently, an investment tribunal will
have to apply strict scrutiny in order to delineate opportunistic
behavior and the good faith reaction to contingencies.
Notwithstanding, umbrella clauses do not exclude the
invocation of doctrines addressing contingencies and
consequently do not make host States liable for unforeseen
future developments that are outside the contractual risk
allocation.
D. REGULATION AND TERMINATION OF INVESTOR-STATE
CONTRACTS
While doctrines relating to the change of circumstances
concern the influence of future contingencies upon the
relationship between the parties, another source of significant
interference with the contractual rights under investor-State
contracts is the host State's power to regulate or even terminate
contracts in the public interest."8  Both regulation and
termination in the public interest can abridge the original
promises made by the host State and thus negatively influence
the contractual rights of an investor. Thus, the regulation of
investor-State contracts-e.g. changing emission standards for a
production plant run by a foreign investor-may impose
additional burdens on the investor's economic activity, make the
performance of its obligations more onerous, and thus affect the
initial contractual equilibrium. The question, therefore, arises
whether umbrella clauses prohibit such host State measures
and immunize investor-State contracts against any regulation
or termination in the public interest.
208. Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 35, at 185-87 (discussing the impact of
government zoning regulation on private party relationships for development).
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Unlike the unilateral reaction of the host State to
contingencies, the regulation of contracts actually interferes
with contractually negotiated rights and obligations. Contract
regulation could thus be seen as a case of opportunistic behavior
that constitutes a violation of an umbrella clause, since the host
State avails itself of its sovereign power to modify or terminate
the initial bargain. However, not every regulatory interference
with contractual relationships constitutes opportunistic and
rent-seeking behavior of the host State. Instead, certain
regulatory conduct solely serves to further contract-external
public interests. Such regulation, it is submitted, can be
implemented without constituting a violation of an umbrella
clause based on an implicit police power exception.
Furthermore, in certain limited circumstances States can also
terminate investor-State contracts based on a superseding
public interest. Such an exception for the regulation of investor-
State contracts can be justified, despite the lack of a basis in the
wording of most umbrella clauses, with the host State's duty to
act in the public interest that has always been recognized under
customary international law and domestic legal systems and
has arguably not been superseded by the conclusion of
investment treaties. It is thus argued that a police power
exception has to be read into the interpretation and application
of umbrella clauses. Under this exception, the regulation of
investor-State contracts and the interference with contractual
rights in the public interest is permissible, provided that it does
not impose disproportionate or discriminatory burdens on the
foreign investor. In some cases this may require the payment of
compensation in order to make the interference lawful. Yet,
such interferences will not engage the host State's international
responsibility for unlawful behavior based on a violation of an
umbrella clause.
1. The State's Power to Interfere with Investor-State Contracts
under Customary International Law
State practice and jurisprudence of international courts and
tribunals has rather consistently recognized that under
customary international law States hold the power to interfere
with investor-State contracts in the public interest and cannot
contract away this power. Thus, in the Oliva Case the Italian-
Venezuelan Claims Commission considered that the termination
of a concession and the expulsion of the investor were justified
[Vol. 18:1
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in the public interest, because the investor was suspected to
have cooperated with revolutionary factions. However, the
Commission required compensation of the investor because "a
nation, like an individual, is bound by its contract and although
it may possess the power to break it, is obliged to pay the
damages resultant upon its action.""2 9 Similarly, the French-
Venezuelan Claims Commission in Company General of the
Orinoco Case accepted the entitlement of the host State to
unilaterally terminate a mining concession that had created
political tensions with a neighboring State. According to the
Commission, as the government's "duty of self-preservation rose
superior to any question of contract, it had the power to
abrogate the contract in whole or in part .... It considered the
peril superior to the obligation and substituted therefore the
duty of compensation."
'210
Similarly, the Tribunal in Czechoslovakia v. Radio
Corporation of America confirmed that "any alteration or
cancellation of an agreement ... as a rule should only be
possible subject to compensation to the other party."2 " ' Notably,
this case did not only refer to the cancellation of an investor-
State contract but a modification of the content of a contract.
Furthermore, the Tribunal emphasized that States could not
restrict their obligation to regulate and interfere with investor-
State contracts in the public interest by means of a contract
with private individuals, but were restricted to make use of this
power, subject to the requirement of compensation, in order to
protect "public interests of vital importance." '212 Similarly,
several other arbitral decisions recognized the entitlement of the
State to terminate public contracts subject to paying
compensation to affected foreign investors.2 3
More recently, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in
Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Iran dealt with the
relationship between the stability of investor-State contracts
and the responsibility of the State to attend to the public
interest. It presented a balanced approach, but also required the
209. Oliva (Italy v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 600, 609.
210. Company General of the Orinoco (Fr. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 184, 280.
211. Admin. of Posts and Tel. of the Republic of Czechoslovakia v. Radio Corp. of
Am. (Czechoslovakia v. Radio Corporation of America), 1932 Hague Ct. (Apr. 1), 30
AM. J. INT'L L. 523, 531 (1936).
212. Id.
213. See Shufeldt Claim (Guatemala v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1079, 1095 (1929);
Norwegian Shipowners Claims (Norway v. U.S.), 1 U.N.R.I.A.A. 307, 338 (1922). See
also Weil, supra note 3, 101 & 217 et seq.
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host State to pay compensation for certain interferences. The
Tribunal explained that the good faith execution of contracts:
must not be equated with the principle pacta sunt servanda often
invoked by claimants in international arbitrations. To do so would
suggest that sovereign States are bound by contracts with private
parties exactly as they are bound by treaties with other sovereign
States. This would be completely devoid of any foundation in law or
equity and would go much further than any State has ever permitted
in its own domestic law. In no system of law are private interests
permitted to prevail over duly established public interest, making
impossible actions required for the public good. Rather private parties
who contract with a government are only entitled to fair compensation
when measures of public policy are implemented at the expense of
their contract rights. 214
Quite similarly, the European Court of Human Rights
recognized the specific prerogatives of the State in its
contractual relations with private individuals. In a case
concerning the unilateral termination of a construction contract
between a private contractor and Greece's former military
government, the Court explained:
The Court does not doubt that it was necessary for the democratic
Greek State to terminate a contract which it considered to be
prejudicial to its economic interests. Indeed according to the case-law
of international courts and of arbitration tribunals any State has a
sovereign power to amend or even terminate a contract concluded with
private individuals, provided it pays compensation. This both reflects
recognition that the superior interests of the State take precedence
over contractual obligations and takes account of the need to preserve
a fair balance in a contractual relationship. 215
International courts and tribunals have therefore accepted
that under general international law the host State is entitled to
interfere with investor-State contracts, if this serves the host
State's public interest.2"6 This entitlement is, however, regularly
214. Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 242-243
(1987).
215. Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep.
293, 328-29 (1994) (citing Shufeldt (U.S. v. Guat.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1079, 1095).
215. Similarly, international law scholarship accepts this prerogative of the
State under customary international law. IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN,
INVESTITIONEN IN ENTWICKLUNGSLANDERN UND DAS VOLKERRECHT 39-40 (1963); see
also RUDOLF L. BINDSCHEDLER, VERSTAATLICHUNGSMABNAHMEN UND
ENTSCHADIGUNGSPFLICHT NACH VOLKERRECHT 39-40 (1950); FRICK, supra note 205,
at 52 ("dem besonders eng auszulegenden Prinzip der Opfergrenze, des
Selbsterhaltungsrechts des einzelnen Staates"); ALFRED VERDROSS, VOLKERRECHT
412 et seq. (5th ed. 1964); A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts with Aliens: The
Question of Unilateral Change by the State in Contemporary International Law, 9 J.
INT'L ARB., Dec. 1992, at 141, 145 (1992) ("The public interest requires that the
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subject to a compensation requirement.
2. The State's Power to Interfere with State Contracts under
Domestic Laws
The power of the State to modify or terminate a contract
with an individual in the public interest has also been accepted
in the major domestic legal systems, lending further support to
the conclusion that the power of the State to interfere with
investor-State contracts in the public interest constitutes a
general principle of law."7 French administrative law, for
example, recognizes that the administration is entitled, if not
required, to unilaterally modify so-called contrats administratifs
in the public interest, subject to the payment of compensation.2"'
Similarly, English law has accepted that the State has the
power to modify or terminate contracts to which it is a party if a
superseding public interest is at play. Following the leading
case, Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King, English courts
consider that "it is not competent for the Government to fetter
its future executive action, which must necessarily be
determined by the needs of the community when the question
arises. It cannot by contract hamper its freedom of action in
matters which concern the welfare of the State."2 9 Even though
governmental authority be empowered to carry out continuous supervision over the
execution of the contract and it also authorizes the governmental authority to
undertake certain unilateral powers: to suspend, vary or rescind the contract, to
transfer it to another party, or to take it over itself. The public interest not only
authorizes the governmental authority to exercise powers, but also places it under a
duty to exercise such powers as part of its responsibility to the public.") (emphasis
added); Weil, supra note 3 at 101, 217 et seq. Cf. Colin C. Turpin, Public Contracts,
in VII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 38 (Konrad Zweigert &
Ulrich Drobnig eds., 1981) ("The prerogatives of the administration commonly
include a power of unilateral variation of the conditions of the contract, such that the
contractor may be required to perform more expeditiously, render different services,
conform to different specifications, or otherwise depart from the original stipulations
of the contract.") (emphasis added).
216. See also Maniruzzaman, supra note 215215, at 146-59. Cf. DOLZER, supra
note 54, at 213 et seq.; Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1
ICSID REV. 41 (1986) (regarding the interaction between domestic legal systems and
general principles of law as a way to clarify customary international law as well as
treaty law).
217. Conseil d'Etat [CE] Decisions of March 11, 1910 - Compagnie gdn&ale
franqaise des tramways; Conseil d'Etat, Decisions of Feb. 2, 1983 - Union des
Transports publics.
219. Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King, [1921] 3 K.B. 500, 503; see also
COLIN C. TURPIN & A. TOMKINS, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 705-
07 (6th ed. 2007) (making reference to more recent case law).
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the question of compensation for such interferences still seems
to be unsettled,22 ° English common law accepts that a State
cannot contract away its power to interfere with contracts in the
public interest. A similar position is endorsed by other common
law jurisdictions, such as Australia, New Zealand and
Canada."'
The power of the State to interfere with contracts based on
a police power exception is also accepted under the U. S.
Constitution.222 In the Blaisdell case, the U.S. Supreme Court
held, concerning a mortgage moratorium imposed during the
Great Depression, that:
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read
into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting
contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a
government by virtue of which contractual relations are worth while, -
a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and good order of society ... The reservation of this necessary
authority of the state is deemed to be part of the contract.223
The Court further considered the State's power to interfere
with contractual relationships as part of "the police power,
[which] is an exercise of the sovereign right of the government to
protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of
the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts
220. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Availability of Damages for Reliance by a
Government on Executive Necessity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMIC ORDER:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF F. A. MANN ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 70TH BIRTHDAY 21
(Werner Flume et al. eds., 1977).
221. Cf. Newfoundland and Labrador v. Nova Scotia, (Can. v. Can.), [2006] 128
Int'l L. Rep. 435, 446 (2001) ("As a general matter, governments cannot under
Canadian law validly contract so as to fetter their future executive action ....");
Attorney.General for New South Wales v. Quin (1990) 170 C.L.R. 1, 17 (holding with
reference to earlier case law that "[t]he Executive cannot by representation or
promise disable itself from, or hinder itself in, performing a statutory duty or
exercising a statutory discretion to be performed or exercised in the public interest,
by binding itself not to perform the duty or exercise the discretion in a particular
way in advance of the actual performance of the duty or exercise of the power");
Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. v. Minister of Energy, [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, 652 (P.C.)
(holding with respect to the relationship between contractual obligations and
statutory duties that "the contractual fetter would have been ineffective, because it
would have been quite incompatible with the proper exercise of the Minister's
statutory powers in the national interest").
222. See Bernadette Meyler, Economic Emergency and the Rule of Law, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 558, n.42 (2007).
223. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934). Cf. Energy
Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983); East New
York Savings Bank v. Hahn et al., 326 U.S. 230, 231 (1945); Veix v. Sixth Ward
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940).
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between individuals" and engaged in a balancing process of the
competing rights and interests.224 Although the case concerned
contracts between private parties, the Court in Blaisdell already
implied that its reasoning applied to "all contracts, whether
made between States and individuals, or between individuals
only. 225 Subsequently, the Court expressly extended the
principle to contracts between States and individuals.226
The jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals as
well as the situation under several domestic legal systems thus
gives broad support to the conclusion that it is a general
principle of law that a State has the power to modify or even
terminate contracts with private parties in view of a
superseding public interest. It is, however, equally recognized
that the State has, in principle, to compensate the private
individual for damages incurred by such modification or
termination depending on how significantly the contractual
equilibrium is affected. This power of States is, in fact, so well
recognized that it has to be read as an implied exception to the
application and operation of umbrella clauses.
3. Contract Regulation, Contract Termination, and
Opportunistic Behavior
An implicit police power exception to the operation of the
umbrella clause for the regulation of contracts in the public
interest can not only be justified by having recourse to the
State's duty to attend to the public interest and to protect rights
and interests of third parties. The police power exception can
also be justified in economic terms. In many cases, interferences
with investor-State contracts based on subsequent regulation
concern externalities, i.e. effects on unrelated third parties,
which result from the behavior of the investor. Externalities
come into existence because the parties to the contract do not
assume the full costs of their behavior and therefore act, from
an economic perspective, inefficiently. 27 Regulations of the
contract by the host State that impose additional obligations or
224. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 437 (1934) (quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S.
473, 480 (1905)).
225. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435 (quoting Long Island Water Supply Co. v.
Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 692 (1896)).
226. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 14 (1977); City of El
Paso v. Geenberry Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506-09 (1965).
227. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract
Remedies, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 683, 705 (1986).
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interfere with established contractual rights can thus be
justified by showing that the parties do not assume the full costs
of their behavior, but instead impose social costs on third
parties.228 The imposition of additional obligations-through
subsequent regulation-to protect the environment, the
investor's employees, or not to interfere with competition, can
thus be justified from an economic perspective with the
externalities created by the parties' behavior.2 9 Such regulation
of investor-State contracts will therefore not constitute a
violation of an umbrella clause that engages the host State's
international responsibility for unlawful behavior. By contrast,
if the regulation of investor-State contracts constitutes
disguised opportunistic behavior of the host State that does not
aim at furthering a public interest but at enriching the host
State's budget, the State's international responsibility for
violation of an umbrella clause will be engaged. 2 ° It is, thus,
necessary to distinguish meticulously between regulatory
behavior and opportunism in order to avoid general regulation
that is merely used as a pretext to change the contractual
equilibrium to the detriment of foreign investors.
A different issue concerns the question of whether the host
State, in case of non-opportunistic and thus, as regards the
functioning of umbrella clauses, generally permissible
regulation of investor-State contracts, has to provide
compensation. This will depend on a number of factors,
including the importance of the public interest at play, the
degree and the consequences of the interference with an
investor-State contract, the existence of alternative, less
restrictive measures, the question of whether, and to what
degree, the investor's behavior harms competing rights and
interests, etc. These aspects can come into play via a balancing
or proportionality analysis that weighs the public interests
against those of the foreign investor. Consequently, the
228. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
229. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 555.
230. In the event that the host State derives a direct benefit from the regulation
one could depart from a refutable presumption that the regulation constitutes
opportunistic behavior and thus requires compensation. See Sedco, Inc. v. NIOC
(Iran), 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248, 274-79 (1985), for a parallel case concerning
the regulation of property, where the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
established such a presumption.
231. See generally Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing
and Global Constitutionalism, Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series No. 14
(2008).
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termination of investor-State contracts will usually require the
host State to provide compensation, unless the termination will
only be effective far into the future and thus will allow the
investor to recuperate the costs of the investment and derive
some benefits from it. Otherwise, compensation is necessary in
order to stabilize the host State's original promises and allow for
efficient private ordering between investors and States.
In cases of mere regulation of investor-State contracts that
do not go as far as termination of the entire contractual
arrangement, the question of whether compensation is due may
equally be solved based on a proportionality analysis. If the
regulation of an investor-State contract that the host State
imposes strikes a reasonable and proportionate balance in
furthering a legitimate policy goal, for instance the protection of
some interest that is external to the investor-State relationship,
or aims at avoiding negative externalities on third-parties
resulting from the activity of the investor in performing his
contractual obligations, and is based on general and non-
discriminatory rules, such regulation will, in principle, not
require compensation. The situation may be different when the
pursuance of a legitimate policy goal requires the imposition of a
disproportionate or unreasonable burden for foreign investors or
when general regulation has the result of unequally burdening
specific investors who are, because of special circumstances,
affected more than other investors. In such cases of general
regulation imposing "special burdens" on some, but not all
investors, compensation may be necessary in order to
counterbalance disproportionate burdens. 32
The argument that umbrella clauses do not remove the
power of the host State to terminate or regulate investor-State
contracts in the public interests can also be supported by
drawing a parallel to the protection of property against
expropriation under both customary international law and
investment treaties. With regard to both bodies of law, States
are entitled to take property of foreign investors based on the
State's power of eminent domain for a public purpose,
implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, and subject to
compensation.233  The same should equally apply to the
232. Cf. Thomas W. Wdlde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment
Protection and "Regulatory Taking" in International Law, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
811, 845-46. (2001) (discussing a similar view in the context of the regulation of
property).
233. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
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termination of investor-State contracts, given that it is widely
accepted that rights under an investor-State contract constitute
property rights that are protected under customary
international law."' However, just as the host State can exercise
its right of eminent domain in respect of property rights, it
should be able to terminate contracts, provided there is a public
interest at play and that the termination does not constitute a
discriminatory act against the investor in question.
V. THE SCOPE OF UMBRELLA CLAUSES
Not only the function of umbrella clauses and their impact
on the substantive relations between foreign investors and host
States have troubled arbitral tribunals. Another central point of
debate in the jurisprudence on umbrella clauses is the scope of
application ratione materiae of the clauses. The Tribunal in SGS
v. Pakistan, for example, was decisive in denying that the clause
in question constituted an umbrella clause because this:
would [have] amoun[ted] to incorporating by reference an unlimited
number of State contracts, as well as other municipal law instruments
setting out State commitments including unilateral commitments to
an investor of the other Contracting Party. Any alleged violation of
those contracts and other instruments would be treated as a breach of
the BIT.235
Similarly, the Tribunal in El Paso v. Argentina considered
that a broad interpretation of an umbrella clause would indeed
cover "the violation of any legal obligation of a State, and not
only of any contractual obligation with respect to investment." '2 36
Other tribunals underscore the breadth of the type of
"commitments" covered by umbrella clauses. The Tribunal in
Enron v. Argentina, for example, considered that "[u]nder its
ordinary meaning the phrase 'any obligation' refers to
obligations regardless of their nature. Tribunals interpreting
this expression have found it to cover both contractual
obligations such as payment as well as obligations assumed
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 89-92 (2008).
234. See Schwebel, supra note 65, 409-11; Jennings, supra note 58, at 173 n.5
(both citing various cases confirming that contractual rights can form the object of
expropriation).
235. SGS Soci~t6 G6n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para.
168 (Aug. 6, 2003).
236. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 71-88 (Apr. 27, 2006).
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through law or regulation.123
This section thus considers the scope of application ratione
materiae of umbrella clauses and develops it from the function
of the clauses to allow for private ordering between investors
and host States in the investment-related context. Against this
background, it is argued that umbrella clauses cover the
enforcement of all investment-related promises of the host State
that are either contractual in nature or constitute a functional
substitute for an investor-State contract. What this section
therefore stresses is the connection between the operation of
umbrella clauses and the scope of application of investment
treaties ratione materiae.
A. THE PROTECTION OF CONTRACTUAL PROMISES AND THE
NOTION OF INVESTMENT
Investor-State contracts are-without doubt-covered by
the scope of application of an umbrella clause because the host
State's promise made in them is the basis for the performance of
the investor's obligation. Its enforcement is necessary to enable
efficient and effective investor-State cooperation. Accordingly,
non-observance by the host State of investor-State contracts has
posed little difficulty in arbitral practice and is considered to be
covered by umbrella clauses.238 In Fedax v. Venezuela, for
instance, promissory notes were considered to be covered by an
umbrella clause.239 Similarly, the Tribunal in SGS v. Philippines
held that an umbrella clause "includes commitments or
obligations arising under contracts entered into by the host
State.""24 Likewise other tribunals considered that umbrella
clauses cover "[c]onsensual obligations ... with regard to, and
237. Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, para. 274 (May 22, 2007).
238. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, paras. 170-74 (Oct. 3, 2006); Noble Ventures, Inc. v.
Romania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/li, Award, paras. 51 (Oct. 12, 2005)
("[C] onsidering the wording of Art. II (2)(c) which speaks of 'any obligation [a party]
may have entered into with regard to investments', it is difficult not to regard this as
a clear reference to investment contracts.").
239. Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/96/3,
Award, para. 29 (Mar. 9, 1998).
240. SGS Soci~t6 G6n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 127 (Jan. 29,
2004).
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as between, obligor and obligee," '2 4  "contractual
arrangements," '242 and "investment contracts. 243
An umbrella clause does not, however, cover every
contractual obligation between foreign investor and host State.
Instead, the contract entered into by the host State has to
qualify as an investment in the sense of the applicable
investment treaty. Although this will often be the case with
respect to contracts between a foreigner and the State, the
notion of investment excludes non-investment-related contracts,
such as contracts about the sale of goods between an investor
and the host State, from the protection of investment treaties
and umbrella clauses. An investor selling and delivering goods,
such as school benches or railroad machinery across the border,
while entering into a contract with a foreign State, cannot avail
itself of the protection of an investment treaty, because trans-
border sales contracts do not qualify as investment. 44 Instead, it
is necessary that there be at least some connection to the
territory of the host State in the form of an establishment 245 and
submission to the power of the host State.246
The restriction of the protection of umbrella clauses to
investment-related contracts has also been recognized in the
arbitral jurisprudence. It has been referred to by several
tribunals that noted that umbrella clauses only protected
obligations or undertakings with regard to investments.247 While
241. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Annulment, para. 95(b) (Sept. 25, 2007).
242. Eureko, Partial Award, supra note 6, para. 250.
243. Noble Ventures, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, at para. 51; see also SGS
Soci~t6 Gknkrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, paras. 162-73
(Aug. 6, 2003) (supporting that contractual arrangements would fall under the scope
of application of an umbrella clause); cf. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, para. 297 (Sept. 5, 2008).
244. See sources cited supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
245. Cf. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, at para. 99.
246. Cf. Bayview Irrigation Dist. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/1,
Award, paras. 93-103 (June 19, 2007); DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 233, at
60-71; Yves G. L. Wolters, The Meaning of "Investment" in Treaty Disputes:
Substantive or Jurisdictional?- Lessons from Nagel v. Czech Republic and S.D.
Myers v. Canada, 8 J. WORD INV. & TRADE 175, (2007); Farouk Yala, The Notion of
"Investment" in ICSID Case Law: a Drifting Jurisdictional Requirement? Some "Un-
Conventional" Thoughts on Salini, SGS and Mihaly, 22 J. INT'L ARB. 105, 117-20
(2005).
247. Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of
Ecuador, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, para. 325 (Aug. 18, 2008);
Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, paras. 273-74 (May 22, 2007); Siemens A.G. v.
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most cases involving application of umbrella clauses clearly
concerned investment-related contracts, the decision in Joy
Mining v. Egypt may elucidate the restriction of umbrella
clauses to investment-related contracts. Here, the Claimant
invoked, inter alia, a breach of the umbrella clause in the
British-Egyptian BIT based on the breach of an agreement with
an Egyptian State agency concerning delivery and installation
of longwall mining systems. In the case at hand, a dispute arose
after the Claimant installed the equipment as to whether the
performance of the investor's obligations had been in accordance
with the contract. Alleging that the Claimant had not performed
its contractual obligations satisfactorily, the agency refused to
release bank guarantees that had been given by the Claimant in
order to secure the performance of its obligations.
The Tribunal, however, held that neither the bank
guarantees nor the underlying contract qualified as an
investment under Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, because
they were rather comparable to simple sales contracts and
declined its jurisdiction ratione materiae.24 8 In this context, it
also commented on the Claimant's reliance on the umbrella
clause as establishing jurisdiction for alleged contractual
breaches. It stated:
In this context, it could not be held that an umbrella clause inserted in
the treaty, and not very prominently, could have the effect of
transforming all contract disputes into investment disputes under the
Treaty, unless of course there would be a clear violations of Treaty
rights and obligations or a violations of contract rights of such a
magnitude as to trigger the Treaty protection, which is not the case.
249
These observations might be interpreted, and in fact have
been, as supporting a restrictive reading of the function of an
umbrella clause as requiring a substantial interference with
contractual rights or interference by the host State with a
contract in its quality as a sovereign.25 It seems, however,
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, para. 206 (Feb. 6,
2007); Noble Ventures, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, at para. 51; LG&E Energy Corp.
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability,
paras. 169-75 (Oct. 3, 2006); Eureko, Partial Award, supra note 6, para. 246.
248. Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/11, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 41 et seq. (July 30, 2004).
249. Id. para. 81.
250. See El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/03/15, Decision of Jurisdiction, paras. 78-79 (Apr. 27, 2006); Pan American
Energy LLC, and BP Argentina Exploration Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/03/13, and BP America Production Co., Pan American Sur
SRL, Pan American Fueguina, SRL and Pan American Continental SRL v.
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questionable whether the above quoted statement of the
Tribunal in Joy Mining actually supports such a reading.
Certainly, the passage is not a model of clarity as to the
meaning the Tribunal wants to convey. Yet, instead of reading it
as expressing the view that umbrella clauses only protect
against sovereign breaches of investor-State contracts, the
quoted paragraph arguably makes much more sense if it is read
as a rejection of the argument that umbrella clauses establish
jurisdiction of an investment tribunal for any contractual
claims, independent of the subject matter of the contract and
the scope of application ratione materiae of the investment
treaty. What the passage then emphasizes is that umbrella
clauses do not grant treaty-based jurisdiction for breaches of
non-investment-related contracts. Consequently, an umbrella
clause does not broaden the subject matter jurisdiction of treaty-
based tribunals beyond the limits of what constituted protected
investment under the respective investment treaty.
Similarly, many contracts between a host State and a
foreign investor might not qualify as investment agreements or
investment-related contracts, even if the foreigner has a
presence in the host State. A contract of the ministry of a host
State concerning the purchase of cars produced by a foreign
investor in the host State, for example, will not come under the
definition of an investment for purposes of the umbrella clause,
because the contract is not investment-related, but a contract
over the sale of goods that does not concern the investor's
investment.25 ' While unilateral modification or termination of
such contracts could possibly constitute a violation of other
investor's rights, namely the fair and equitable treatment
standard, a claim for the breach of such contracts cannot be
brought as a violation of an umbrella clause. This limitation is,
however, not due to the limitation of the umbrella clause to
breaches of a sovereign nature, but because a non-investment-
related contract is not covered by the scope of application of the
umbrella clause. The concern that the umbrella clause
transforms the violation of any contractual agreement into an
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/8 (consolidated claims),
Decision on Preliminary Objections, paras. 107-08 (July 27, 2006) (both claiming
that this is the content of the statement of the Tribunal in Joy Mining v. Egypt).
251. Cf. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, para. 99 ("For example
the construction of an embassy in a third State, or the provision of security services
to such an embassy, would not involve investments in the territory of the State
whose embassy it was, and would not be protected by the BIT.").
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investment dispute is therefore ill-founded. Instead, much of the
purely fiscal contracting of States will not fall under the notion
of investment and therefore be outside the scope of application
of an umbrella clause. Consequently, investment treaty
arbitration will not be available in case of breach of such
contracts.
B. UMBRELLA CLAUSE AND UNILATERAL PROMISES BY THE HOST
STATE
The scope of operation of umbrella clauses is, however, not
limited to contractual promises of the host State contained in
investor-State contracts. Instead, it arguably also encompasses
other specific promises the host State made in its national
legislation, by means of individual administrative instruments,
and the like. In fact, in many legal systems the State acts vis-a-
vis private individuals and provides legal security and stability
for large-scale investment projects, not through contractual
arrangements, but by means of unilateral public law licenses
that are passed on the basis of a general law. In Germany, for
example, even the operation of public utilities, such as waste
landfills or nuclear power plants, is often not conducted on the
basis of investor-State contracts that set out the mutual rights
and obligations. Instead, the competent administrative agencies
unilaterally grant, based on the governing statutory law, a
license that authorizes the individual's activity in question.252
Similarly, specific promises to investors are sometimes directly
contained in domestic legislation, such as legislative promises
granting special tax benefits over a significant number of future
years for specific investments in order to encourage them.
The question therefore arises whether the breach of such
non-contractual promises can also give rise to the host State's
liability for a violation of an umbrella clause or whether, in
turn, umbrella clauses are limited to breaches of investor-State
contracts in the strict sense of the term. The more convincing
arguments militate for a broad substantive coverage of umbrella
252. The public law instrument used in this context is an administrative act
(Verwaltungsakt), a unilateral decision that grants or imposes rights and duties
upon individuals in concrete cases. See Verwaltungsverfahrengesetz rVwVfG]
[Administrative Law Code], § 35. Contractual relationships between the State and
private enterprises, on the other hand, are rarer, although the German
Administrative Law contains the instrument of the public law contract and makes
use of it increasingly. See id. §§ 54-62.
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clauses, covering not only contractual promises but also
administrative acts and promises contained in domestic
legislation. While the precise wording of the umbrella clause in
question is, of course, determinative, the clauses are regularly
worded broadly as applying to the observance of "commitments"
or "obligations" that the host State has entered into vis-a-vis
foreign investors without limitations to contractual obligations
or commitments.
Furthermore, the functional understanding of umbrella
clauses as backing up private ordering between host States and
foreign investors also militates for a broad scope of application
ratione materiae of the clauses. What is decisive from this
perspective is not the form of the host State's commitment, but
whether it is at the basis of an investment-related and
transaction-specific relationship between the foreign investor
and the host State, independent of its legal basis in an investor-
State contract, a concession, a license, an administrative act, or
legislation. Instead from an economic perspective, it makes no
difference whether an investor starts carrying out a specific
investment on the basis of an investor-State contract or a
specific commitment of the host State in another legal
instrument.2 53 As long as the administrative or legislative
promise by the host State was the reason an investment was
made and was intended to induce such investment, such
promises should, just like contractual promises, qualify as
commitments for the scope of application of umbrella clauses. It
must be born in mind, however, that the regulatory and
legislative framework underlying the granting of individual
administrative acts usually contains grounds for revocation.
These grounds become part of the legal framework governing
relations between the investor and the host State and may allow
revocation of a license without a breach of the host State
promise."'
A broad interpretation of the type of commitments covered
by an umbrella clause is also shared by most of the arbitral
jurisprudence. It emphasizes-the wording of the umbrella
253. See GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, DER SCHUTZ VON AUSLANDSINVESTITIONEN
16 (1969) (considering that the essence not the form is decisive in the context of
public contracts).
254. However, the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment may offer relief, for
example, if the revocation is disproportionate, the host State misused its discretion
in revoking a license, or did not grant due process. See Schill, supra note 13, at
24-26.
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clause in question permitting-that any commitment
independent of its legal basis can be covered by an umbrella
clause as long as it is of a specific and investment-related
character. In SGS v. Philippines, for example, the Tribunal
considered that commitments covered by the umbrella clauses
"must have assumed a legal obligation, and it must have been
assumed vis-A-vis the specific investment-not as a matter of
the application of some legal obligation of a general
character." '255 Similarly, as the Annulment Committee in CMS v.
Argentina pointed out, the commitments covered by an umbrella
clause must constitute "specific obligations concerning the
investment. They do not cover general requirements imposed by
the law of the host State."'256
The irrelevance of the legal basis of the commitment is also
confirmed by the Decision on Liability in LG&E v. Argentina,
where the Tribunal considered that a specific tariff regime
contained in the regulatory and legislative framework for the
Argentine gas distribution sector was covered by the umbrella
clause in the US-Argentine BIT. The Tribunal argued:
In order to determine the applicability of the umbrella clause, the
Tribunal should establish if by virtue of the provisions of the Gas Law
and its regulations, the Argentine State has assumed international
obligations with respect to LG&E and its investment. . . . Argentina
made these specific obligations to foreign investors, such as LG&E, by
enacting the Gas Law and other regulations, and then advertising
these guarantees in the Offering Memorandum to induce the entry of
foreign capital to fund the privatization program in its public service
sector. These laws and regulations became obligations within the
255. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, at para. 121; see also Enron
Corp. and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/01/3, Award, paras. 274-76 (May 22, 2007); Siemens A.G. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, para. 206 (Feb. 6, 2007);
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/11, Award,
para. 51 (Oct. 12, 2005); Eureko, Partial Award, supra note 6, para. 246 ('Any'
obligation is capacious; it means not only obligations of a certain type, but 'any'-
that is to say, all-obligations entered into with regard to investments of investors of
the other Contracting Party."). Cf SGS Socidt6 Gdndrale de Surveillance S.A. v.
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on
Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 166 (Aug. 6, 2003) ("The 'commitments' the
observance of which a Contracting Party is to 'constantly guarantee' are not limited
to contractual commitments. The commitments referred to may be embedded in, e.g.,
the municipal legislative or administrative or other unilateral measures of a
Contracting Party.") (internal citation omitted).
256. Cf. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/9, Award, para. 297-302 (Sept. 5, 2008); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Annulment,
para. 95 (Sept. 25, 2007).
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meaning of Article II(2)(c), by virtue of targeting foreign investors and
applying specifically to their investments, that gave rise to liability
under the umbrella clause.
25 7
What is decisive for a commitment to be covered is whether the
host State's act contains a specific commitment that serves as a
functional substitute for an investor-State contract.258
While determination of whether a legislative commitment is
specific enough to constitute a commitment covered under an
umbrella clause will depend on the specific circumstances of the
case, it will usually be necessary for the legislative commitment
to confer specific and individual rights upon investors as an
incentive to invest, or make specific promises in return for
certain actions an investor engages in. This is the case, for
example, if the host State passes general legislation that
intends to promote investments in a specific economic sector and
is fully aware that the stability of the legislative promise is the
precondition for investors to engage in the desired activity.
What will, by contrast, not be sufficient as constituting a
commitment covered by an umbrella clause are rules of the
general legal framework that merely aim at regulating certain
investment activities without intending to create reliance of the
investor in the stability of this framework or intending to create
a deliberate incentive for certain investment activities.
257. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, para. 174 (Oct. 3, 2006) (citing v. Philippines, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/6, at para. 121, concerning the juxtaposition of general and specific
commitments).
257. See also FRICK, supra note 206, at 205 ("Die Vertragsstaaten sichern sich
gegenseitig zu, auch solche nicht-vblkerrechtliche Verpflichtungen einzuhalten, die
sie in Bezug auf Kapitalanlagen von Investoren der anderen Vertragspartei in ihrem
Hoheitsgebiet iibernommen haben. Damit sind all die einseitigen oder auf Grund
vertragsdhnlicher Vereinbarungen gemachten Zusagen staatlicher
Zulassungsstellen angsprochen. Die speziellen Verpflichtungen, die eine Einzelstaat
gegentiber einem auslindischen Investor im Interesse der F6rderung der nationalen
Wirtschaft Uibernimmt, werden in dieser Weise ihrem Inhalt und Bestand nach
v6lkerrechtlich abgesichert, auch soweit sie ausschliellich auf innerstaatlichem
Recht beruhen und nicht in irgendeiner Form, internationalisiert' sind.") (footnotes
omitted). Recent Swiss investment treaty practice also confirms that umbrella
clauses do not only intend to cover contractual promises of host States vis-A-vis
foreign investors but also specific obligations and promises stemming from national
legislation, international agreements, or undertakings under administrative law.
See MICHAEL SCHMID, SWISS INVESTMENT PROTECTION AGREEMENTS: MOST-
FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT AND UMBRELLA CLAUSES 63 (2007).
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VI. CONCLUSION: TAMING THE SPIRITS
The application and interpretation of umbrella clauses have
posed significant problems for arbitral tribunals and brought
about incompatible and conflicting decisions. Inconsistencies
have arisen with respect to the construction of umbrella clauses,
the scope of commitments covered by them, the effect of the
clauses on the jurisdiction of treaty-based tribunals, and their
effects on the regulatory power of States regarding investor-
State cooperation. Above all, what has been unsettled since
arbitral tribunals began applying umbrella clauses is their
function and relation to customary international law, with its
limited protection of investor-State contracts. In this regard, it
is essentially two views that compete. One regards the clauses
as a codification of customary international law that merely
clarifies that investor-State contracts are protected against
expropriatory conduct. Consequently, umbrella clauses in this
view require that the host State engages in conduct 6, titre de
souverain in breaching one of its earlier promises vis-A-vis the
foreign investor. The opposite position attributes a more
expansive function to umbrella clauses. In this view, the clauses
allow investors to bring a claim for the violation of an
investment treaty based on the breach of an investment-related
promise by the host State, independent of whether the breach
was based on sovereign or commercial conduct.
This article argues that the more restrictive view that
requires host State conduct & titre de souverin is unconvincing
and does not give a convincing account of the function of
umbrella clauses, since the protection against sovereign conduct
is already afforded by other investors' rights, in particular by
the protection against direct and indirect expropriation and the
fair and equitable treatment standard. The restrictive approach
thus turns umbrella clauses into superfluous treaty provisions.
Furthermore, arguments concerning the historical emergence of
umbrella clauses suggest that the clauses were intended to
serve a proper function in filling gaps resulting from the
traditional dualist conception of international law that
distinguished categorically between international law and
national law, the investor-State and the inter-State relations, as
well as claims for the breach of contracts and treaties. The
function of umbrella clauses, it was argued, thus consists in
opening recourse to an international dispute settlement forum
in order to enable investors to enforce contractual and quasi-
contractual promises made by the host State and to counter
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opportunistic behavior of the host State that can undermine the
initially-struck bargain, independent of whether the host State's
breach was based on commercial or sovereign conduct. By
providing a forum for settling disputes arising out of investor-
State relations, umbrella clauses therefore enable effective and
comprehensive "private ordering" between investors and host
States because the investor is in a position to enforce promises
made by the State and have a sanction imposed in the form of
damages in case they are breached. As regards their scope of
application ratione materiae, this article argues that umbrella
clauses cover specific promises by host States contained in
investor-State contracts, but also those quasi-contractual
commitments under domestic law, including administrative law
instruments and legislation, that specifically aim at inducing
certain investment-related activity and are thus functionally
equivalent to an investor-State contract.
Viewing the function of umbrella clause in enabling "private
ordering" in investor-State relations can also be supported with
arguments stemming from an economic analysis of what
institutional infrastructure is necessary in order to allow for
efficient investor-State cooperation. Efficient cooperation
between investors and host States, it was argued, requires
above all the immunization of the contractual relationship
against opportunistic behavior of the host State, independent of
whether it materializes in sovereign or commercial conduct,
through institutionalizing structures of ex post control and
governance by third-party dispute settlement. While customary
international law as well as investment treaty standards such
as the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment or the concept
of indirect expropriation already protected foreign investments,
including investor-State contracts, against interference of a
sovereign nature, breaches of investor-State contracts based on
commercial conduct of the host State were left uncovered under
international law. Consequently, it was argued that umbrella
clauses aimed at closing this gap in protection by stabilizing
investor-State cooperation ex post by offering effective
enforcement mechanisms on the level of international law in
order to counter opportunistic host State behavior of both
sovereign and commercial nature. The more restrictive approach
that limits the scope of application of umbrella clauses to
contract breaches & titre de souverain, by contrast, fails to
provide the enforcement mechanisms necessary to counter
opportunistic behavior by host States with respect to simple,
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commercial breaches that do not involve sovereign conduct.
While this enforcement function of umbrella clauses
reinforces the principle of pacta sunt servanda for the host
State's commitments vis-h-vis the foreign investor, it does not
alter the legal nature of the relationship between investor and
host State. Umbrella clauses do not transform breaches of
commitments under domestic law into breaches of international
law; they merely open recourse to investment treaty arbitration
in order to enforce host State promises that are governed by
municipal law, or whatever law is chosen by the parties.
Whether a host State has made a specific commitment and
whether this commitment has been breached is determined
purely according to the law governing the relations between the
investor and the host State, not by the umbrella clause.
Similarly, umbrella clauses are limited to targeting
opportunistic behavior of host States and do not prohibit non-
opportunistic behavior, such as the alteration of host State
promises in view of future contingencies that affect the
relationship between foreign investor and host State, nor do
they influence the filling of gaps that become apparent in
investor-State relations. Consequently, umbrella clauses do not
exclude exceptions to the sanctity of contracts based on
doctrines of change of circumstances, force majeure, or necessity,
nor do they exclude the State's police power to regulate or even
terminate investor-State contracts in the public interest, subject
to a compensation requirement depending on the circumstances.
With respect to the substantive protection they offer,
umbrella clauses do not impose stricter standards upon the
observance of commitments by States vis-h-vis aliens than
customary international law. They do, however, provide an
international forum for the settlement of disputes arising out of
the breach of a host State's promise vis-h-vis a foreign investor
which encompasses not only breaches that were traditionally
considered to constitute violations of customary international
law, but offer dispute settlement and enforcement for any
breaches of host State promises. Access to treaty-based
arbitration for such disputes is determined independently by the
obligation of the host State under the umbrella clause to observe
commitments vis-A-vis foreign investors. Jurisdiction of treaty-
based tribunals, it was argued, can also not be excluded by
forum selection clauses entered into in the investor-State
relations as the claims for the violation of the umbrella clause
constitute a treaty claim even though it is closely connected to a
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claim for the breach of contracts. Overall, the primary function
of umbrella clauses is thus of a procedural and institutional
nature by establishing the jurisdiction of treaty-based arbitral
tribunals for enforcing promises the host State made vis-A-vis a
foreign investor. In this regard, umbrella clauses break with the
limited protection granted to investor-State contracts under
customary international law by comprehensively opening
recourse to investor-State dispute settlement in an international
forum. They do not, by contrast, restrict the host State's
sovereign powers in regulating investor-State relations in the
public interest.
The function of umbrella clause suggested in this article
will also not open the floodgates to an uncontrollable number of
investor-State disputes, a fear that seems to heavily influence
those tribunals that endorse the restrictive approach to the
interpretation of umbrella clauses. First, it needs to be recalled
that umbrella clauses only establish jurisdiction for the breach
of investment-related host State promises. They do not allow
investors to bring a claim based on the violation of domestic law
in general. Nor do they establish jurisdiction of investment
tribunals for breaches of every contract between foreigners and
host States. Rather, the scope of application of umbrella clause
is limited to promises that are related to assets and activities of
foreign investors that qualify as "investment" under the
respective investment treaty. Secondly, umbrella clauses do not
exclude host State regulation of contingencies outside of the
scope of risk allocation of the investor-State relation and do not
curtail the powers of States to regulate investor-State contracts
in the public interest. Finally, a broad understanding of
umbrella clauses will not lead to flooding investment tribunals
with trivial disputes. Instead, investors will have to determine
whether the value of the claim for breach of an umbrella clause
is sufficient to justify the cost risk connected to investment
treaty arbitration.
Instead, the prospect of having investment treaty
arbitration available as an independent and efficient dispute
settlement forum in order to hold States to their investment-
related promises is a well-defined function of umbrella clauses
that does not risk developing unexpected and uncontrolled
extension of investor-State arbitration. Instead, States can
control whether they will risk having to respond to an
investment treaty claim based on the violation of an umbrella
clause. On the one hand, they do not have to enter into any
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contract or other specific commitment vis-A-vis foreign investors;
on the other hand, they control whether to abide by their
promises or to escape from them out of opportunism. Nothing
more, but nothing less, than enabling investors to enforce
investment-related promises that host States have made is what
umbrella clauses intend. They therefore impose predictable
consequences and help to hold States accountable for breaches
of promises they made vis-h-vis foreign investors. The clauses
are thus not the Zauberlehrling's spirits that branch out without
control when they are understood as part of an overarching
framework for enabling and stabilizing private ordering in
investor-State relations, and for enhancing efficient investor-
State cooperation.

